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PROLOGUE: REFLECTIONS

I had the great pleasure and honor of knowing Judge Alvin Rubin. On
occasion, he was my house guest in Cambridge, Massachusetts when I was
on the Harvard Law School faculty. He always arrived with a quart of
shrimp étouffée, which we collaboratively consumed with gusto. I also had
Copyright 2018, by ARTHUR R. MILLER.
* University Professor, New York University. This Article expands and
updates my Alvin and Janice Rubin Lecture delivered at the Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University on March 8, 2017. I have tried to preserve its
conversational style. At several points, however, that style did not translate to
paper, but the substance of my remarks has not been changed. The citations are
designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
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the privilege of arguing cases before him in the Fifth Circuit.1 As a judge,
Alvin had “a profound respect for the law and the limitations it imposes
on judges.”2 His commitment was total. Fellow Fifth Circuit Judge John
Minor Wisdom once described him as someone born to be on the bench.3
My remarks in his memory are personal, at times impressionistic,
reflecting the belief that the aspirational ideas underlying the American
civil justice system are to promote the resolution of disputes on their merits
after an adversarial contest on a level litigation playing field with minimal
technicality. These ideals certainly were the hopes of those distinguished
lawyers and professors who wrote the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
the 1930s. The drafters wanted to give people access to a meaningful day
in court and believed that the procedural process should effectuate those
aspirations. The system the rulemakers created was designed with that in
mind, and many believed that the Federal Rules represented a Gold
Standard that envisioned a trial and, when appropriate, one before a jury.
For example, the rulemakers concluded that simplified pleading
opened the courthouse door and promoted adjudicating a dispute on its
merits with a minimum of motion practice. Wide-angle discovery was
intended to give litigants equal access to all information relevant to the
case’s subject matter, which always has seemed very American to me.
How can you be against enabling litigants to be informed? Especially close
to my heart is the class action, perhaps because I participated in drafting
the 1966 revision of Federal Rule 23. It was designed in part to provide a
receptive procedural vehicle for the world of civil rights litigation that
emerged after the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka,4 in part to promote efficiency—litigants get more judicial bang
for their judicial buck when like things are aggregated and adjudicated
together—in part to achieve consistency of result for all people affected
by the same conduct, and in part to be a mechanism for the joinder of
modest claims that are not economically viable for litigation on an
individual basis—what, today, are called negative value claims.5 Finally,
1. I once argued an en banc appeal before Alvin and 13 of his colleagues.
None of them asked me a single question during the 30 minutes allotted to me—
the Bench’s silence made it a harrowing experience. When I asked him why years
later, he simply said with a twinkle, “I don’t like diversity cases and my colleagues
just wanted to listen to you.”
2. See John Minor Wisdom, Dedication: Judge Alvin Rubin, 52 LA. L. REV.
1371, 1371 (1992).
3. See David W. Robertson, Alvin Rubin’s Last Dissent, 70 TEX. L. REV. 7, 9 (1991).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. I have always believed that whatever small claim class actions may lack
in terms of significant individual compensation they often make up for in terms
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the Rules were written to be useful for enforcing the public policies
embedded in national and state statutes as well as common-law doctrines,
such as antitrust, securities, civil rights, products liability, and other more
recently developed substantive fields, such as environment, pension
protection, privacy, and consumer rights.
I was blessed by having a wonderful procedure professor, mentor, and
role model—Benjamin Kaplan of the Harvard Law School—who imbued
me with the thoughts I just expressed when I was his student and research
assistant.6 My legal education was followed by an apprenticeship in a law
firm at a time when litigation practice was relatively civilized and it
seemed to me that the Federal Rules were working as they were intended
to work. A few years later, life’s fortuities again brought me together with
Ben, who had been appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren as the Reporter
of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of
the United States.7 As a result of a delightful constellation of
circumstances he enticed me to work with him on what a few years later
became the 1966 amendments to those Rules.8
In remembering Judge Rubin and thinking about how best to honor
him, I asked myself whether we are moving toward or away from the
aspirations of my youth, which I know he shared,9 by looking through a
of deterring wrongdoing. See generally David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:
Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011).
6. My indebtedness to Ben is recorded in In Memoriam: Benjamin Kaplan,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1354–57 (2011). My involvement in what became the
1966 Federal Rule amendments is described in Arthur R. Miller, Some Very
Personal Reflections on the Rules, Rulemaking, and Reporters, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 651 (2013).
7. The congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to the Supreme
Court is set out in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2073 (2012). The multi-tiered federal
rulemaking process, its scope, and its difficulties are discussed in Robert G. Bone,
The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and
Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Edward H. Cooper, Rule
23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996); David
L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969 (1989).
8. For what sometimes feels like forever, I have been teaching and writing
about procedure ever since. On days when I am feeling low, I count the number
of times I have taught Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) and Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The final count does not lift my spirits.
9. He was an optimist about the federal courts and their future. See Alvin B.
Rubin, The Role of the Federal Courts in the Next 25 Years, 39 LA. B.J. 44 (1991).
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telescope trained on what is going on in our courts today. What do I see
after almost 60 years of professional devotion to civil procedure—
admittedly mainly federal? Are the Rules still working as they were
intended to work? In a nutshell, my judgment is that many of the principles
I once took for granted have been compromised in the last 30 to 40 years.
Would Alvin agree with me? I think he would. If I am right, were the
rulemakers of the 1930s engaged in wishful thinking? Have I been naïve
all these years? It makes me wonder, as I have over the years: what are
courts for? Indeed, each year I ask my first-year procedure students that
question toward the end of the course. They seem baffled by it. I do not
fault them for being uncertain because, although it seems to be a simple
question, I always have been uncertain about the answer. What are courts
really for? I wish I could ask Alvin.
Is the answer dependent on the movements of time, changes in societal
conditions, and the self-interest of the participants? In part, most certainly.
There obviously have been seismic changes in the law and the legal
profession in my lifetime in terms of demographics, economics, and
culture. Entire new fields of law have emerged; others have been
transformed; and some have been eclipsed. We now have massive law
firms, some are global.10 There even are some large and financially strong
plaintiffs’ firms. Gender, race, and other professional barriers have been
lowered but not eliminated so that the bench, bar, and law schools are far
more diverse than in my youth; the same is true of those who appear in
court. The scale of cases and the legal fees they generate have escalated
beyond anything I could have contemplated when I entered practice, as is
true, for example, in the mass tort and securities fraud fields. New
professional fields and sub-bars have emerged, including public interest,
civil rights, entrepreneurial litigators, aggregators, national practitioners,
sophisticated repeat plaintiffs’ lawyers, children’s attorneys, and senior
citizens’ specialists. Law school curricula today are interdisciplinary,
transnational, and sometimes smack as much of graduate programs as they
do of professional education. And specialization is the order of the day.
But the cliché is apt: law has become a business—a big one.
Inevitably, this shift has produced pluses and minuses. Unfortunately,
there often is so much money on the table that professional judgment and
client loyalty sometimes are compromised. Resource consumption in
mega-cases is so extreme that they appear governed by a Sorcerer’s
Apprentice promoting endless activity. Also, attorney civility seems to be

10. When I was a young associate, the likelihood of a law firm having as
many as 100 lawyers was thought to be as remote as putting a man on the moon
or someone breaking Babe Ruth’s mark of 60 home runs in a baseball season.
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in decline, all too often being replaced by scorched-earth Rambo litigation
tactics or Godzilla-like behavior. On the plus side, practicing law today
can be exciting, intellectually stimulating, ideologically rewarding, and, of
course, for some, lucrative. Moreover, for about 40 years now, law has
provided a career for those attracted to social activism or who seek
involvement in public policy formulation. People now join the profession
to champion various philosophical objectives, protect the rights of an everexpanding range of sub-populations, or press significant causes and
issues.11
In evaluating today’s civil justice system, one of its important
characteristics reflects a piece of Americana that should be kept in mind.
Unlike the judiciaries in many other countries, we historically have
employed our courts to press issues of public significance—even absent
Legislative or Executive Branch authorization or direction—as well as to
challenge governmental conduct. On the national scene, the Judicial
Branch, our least democratic branch—in the sense that federal judges are
not elected and serve for life—generates legal doctrines that produce
social change in various highly sensitive and contentious contexts. These
doctrinal shifts by the judiciary often result because the elected branches are
politically paralyzed, as has been true regarding issues like desegregation,
political reapportionment, abortion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action,
immigration, and capital punishment, or because one of the branches or a
state is acting beyond its constitutional or statutory domain and needs to be
11. Members of the private bar frequently function as a second regulatory
system and often are dubbed “private attorneys general.” See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 377–84 (1983). See generally SEAN
FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2010); Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney
General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE
J. INT’L L. 219 (2001); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History,
95 VA. L. REV. 1131 (2009). The legitimacy and effectiveness of the concept has
been the subject of a noisy debate and partisan politics over the years, see
STEPHEN BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) [hereinafter
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT], and is inextricably
entwined in the pluses and minuses of the entrepreneurial aspects of much of
contemporary litigation. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL
LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015); Myriam Gilles, Can John
Coffee Rescue the Private Attorney General? Lesson from the Credit Card Wars,
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 (2015) (an extended essay based on Professor Coffee’s
book). Individual lawyers, of course, have different motivations. Some attorneys
pursue the public interest, some are entrepreneurial, and others have both
motivations and try to do well by doing good.
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contained.12 It is an aspect of American exceptionalism. What we do in our
courts often is very important, indeed critical, for many people and
institutions, which means that the quality and integrity of the governing
court procedures also are very important and warrant close attention.
But are those procedures functioning consistently with the supposed
objectives of our civil justice system? I will try to respond to that question
by looking first at economic access to the courts. Ask yourself: how many
Americans can afford to pay a lawyer by the hour to remedy a grievance?
And how many lawyers are willing to pursue a claim on a contingent fee
basis—no matter how clear the merits or how important the matter may be
to a potential client and others—for $100, $1,000, $10,000, or even
more—especially if some pretrial discovery and a medical, scientific, or
economic expert will be needed? Reality requires acknowledging that
access to the courts has been priced beyond the reach of the vast majority
of Americans. Honesty also requires us to recognize that meaningful
access depends on a level of equality of economic resources and legal
talent between the contestants that does not exist. We simply have not
come close to achieving that objective; indeed, inequalities in both
categories may well have increased over time.
In certain contexts, of course, access is achievable because a contingent
fee arrangement, or a statutory fee provision,13 or the judicially created
common-fund doctrine provides compensation for a successful attorney.14
12. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (political malapportionment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (consensual, private sodomy); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (campaign financing); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.
493 (2011) (prison overcrowding); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(same-sex marriage).
13. E.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (creating civil liability on account of a false
statement in a security registration); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (providing damages for
violation of a minimum wage and overtime compensation statute); 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3(b) (applying to civil rights actions for injunctive relief for violations of a
public accommodations statute).
14. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980); Sprague v. Ticonic
Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). The
common law principle is of limited utility when purely injunctive or declaratory relief
is sought. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240
(1975). Federal statutory fee provisions have not been liberally interpreted. See, e.g.,
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010) (discussing that a lodestar fee
computation generally takes account of superior contingent fee attorney
performance); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (approving a waiver of fees
under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act) (three Justices dissented).

2018]

WHAT ARE COURTS FOR?

745

These economic mechanisms can incentivize lawyers, but the obvious
caveat is that not every type or dimension of claim is an attractive
candidate for contingent or court-awarded fee representation. And then there
is the ever-present risk of losing, leaving the lawyer without any fee and
substantial sunk costs for discovery, experts, protracted motion practice, and
appeals that cannot be recovered. That unattractive possibility means that
without the availability of funding and a realistic prospect of surviving the
process and ultimately succeeding, most contingent fee lawyers would pass
on investing in a case, effectively foreclosing access. As they say, the
winners must pay for the losers—the former must be maximized and the
latter minimized. Of necessity that means some cases will be accepted and
others rejected, a reality that leaves many unrepresented. Fortunately, pro
bono entities do offer aid to some individuals, but that hardly is universally
available, in part because of various eligibility requirements.
In recent years, a litigation funding industry has emerged in the United
States, as it has elsewhere, that could enhance the prospect of access if it
becomes more widely available. At present, it is a work in progress.15 Most
litigation situations on the plaintiffs’ side, however, do not have the
economic dimension to be attractive to funders. But there may be a viable
business model for providing funding for small or medium sized claims,
particularly when they can be aggregated.16 In any event, for the

15. Various aspects of litigation funding are comprehensively discussed and
analyzed in Proceedings of the 2015 Fall Conference with the Center on Civil
Justice: Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511–
942 (Special Issue 2016); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financers as
Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1316 (2012)
(“[A]ssigning a financier a percentage of the plaintiffs’ winnings converts that
financier into a sizeable stakeholder and incentivizes it to monitor the attorneys
and the litigation’s costs.”); David R. Glickman, Note, Embracing Third-Party
Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043 (2016) (describing how thirdparty litigation finance would allow lawyers to focus on providing high quality
legal services); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of
Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014)
(discussing the potential of litigation funding in the United States); Victoria
Shannon Sahani, Judging Third Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388 (2016)
(suggesting changes in the Federal Rules to allow judges to consider and manage
third-party funding); Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation
Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (2015) (proposing a regulatory
safety net in third party litigation funding arrangements to ensure integrity).
16. See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Private Dollars for Public Litigation:
An Introduction, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 813 (Special Issue 2016). Forms of
crowdfunding are beginning to appear.
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economically disadvantaged, getting to the justice trough is an obstacle
not easily navigated.
Even if a lack of money and difficulties securing a lawyer were not
barriers for claimants, mounting dockets, cases the size of woolly
mammoths, and the complexity of modern litigation have produced
pressures for efficiencies, judicial gatekeeping, and procedural changes
that often seem at odds with the getting-to-the-merits-with-a-minimumof-technicality orientation of the original rulemakers and the assumptions
of my youth. The last 30 years has seen the erection of a series of judicially
or legislatively generated procedural restraints—I call them stop signs—
largely motivated, not surprisingly, by and supportive of defense interests.
These procedural restraints produce earlier and earlier termination of
cases, avoid merit determinations, and generate substantial litigation costs,
delays, and risks. This inhibits people from seeking relief in court, leads
to settlements below market value, or produces premature dismissals.
Because the impact of these restraints often is related to an individual’s
access to funding and professional assistance, I think they exacerbate the
disparities that exist between the haves and the have-nots in our society.
Perhaps today’s procedural obstacle course is the result of pressures
created by systemic resource and capacity limitations, or reflects a
philosophical belief that litigation should be contained and discouraged,
or is the product of a predictable lobbying response by those interests that
increasingly have become the object of large-scale damage actions or the
aggregation of small claims that previously were unviable as individual
cases and never would have been brought. It is true that some of today’s
lawsuits have previously unimagined monetary dimensions and other
consequences that conceivably could devastate an economic entity or
governmental program. But whatever substance these explanations may
have, the time has come to recognize that the procedural stop signs that
have been erected to counter these concerns often work at cross purposes
with the Gold Standard I mentioned earlier. More attention should be paid
to the tension between the two and the consequences of the procedural
paradigm shift that clearly has taken place.
I. EARLY TERMINATION OF CASES: THE PROCEDURAL STOP SIGNS
The retrenchment of American civil procedure is best understood by
examining the recent developments in the federal courts regarding a
number of important litigation elements. Among the effects of what has
happened in recent decades is the increased difficulty of enforcing state
and national public policies, both of statutory and common law origin,
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through private lawsuits. At present, all three branches of our national
government display considerable hostility to litigation.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
I start at the genesis of litigation. The permissible constitutional reach
of the personal jurisdiction of both state and federal courts has been
reduced in what to me are significant ways. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Daimler AG v. Bauman17 has virtually eliminated general jurisdiction,
which previously could be based on the defendant’s continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum even if the events in litigation occurred
elsewhere. It now is limited to those fora in which the defendant is “at
home.”18 The decision appears to eliminate longstanding notions of
corporate presence and doing business and restricts jurisdiction over
disputes unrelated to the forum to the defendant’s state of incorporation
and the state of its principal place of business in the United States, except
in an as yet to be defined “exceptional case.”19 The Court offered no real
explanation for its deviation from what had long been settled doctrine or
articulate why the cabining of general jurisdiction was desirable.20 But it

17. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). See
generally Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (discussing new issues Daimler raised that will likely be the
focus of future litigation); Stephanie Denker, The Future of General Jurisdiction:
The Effects of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145 (2014)
(analyzing the Supreme Court’s holding and discussing Daimler’s potential
impacts on general jurisdiction, the economy, and international affairs); Linda J.
Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and its Implications
for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675
(2015) (discussing the decision’s potential ramifications).
18. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The result in Daimler was foreshadowed in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). More
recently the Court applied Daimler to a Federal Employers’ Liability Act action
in BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017), after concluding that the
statute did not speak to personal jurisdiction. Only Justice Sotomayor dissented,
as she had in Daimler.
19. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
20. The Court’s silence on these matters has been viewed as somewhat
curious. See Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U.
PITT. L. REV. 153, 155–56 (2014) (approving the court’s decision to limit general
jurisdiction to where the defendant is “at home” based on its overall activities);
Richard D. Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15
NEV. L.J. 1161, 1162 (2015) (“[T]he Court’s efforts are puzzling.”). Justice
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is clear who benefits from the constriction: domestic and foreign economic
entities.
And in the specific or long-arm jurisdiction context, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion for four Supreme Court Justices in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro21 reintroduced limiting notions of state sovereignty.22 The
language is somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s opinion 134 years earlier
in Pennoyer v. Neff.23 Passages in the plurality opinion seem to subscribe to
the notion that a defendant must “manifest an intention to submit to the
power of a sovereign” before a court can exercise jurisdiction.24 How many
defendants would ever knowingly “manifest”—let alone acknowledge—
such an intention?25
Ginsberg, who I have known since law school, led the Court on this doctrinal shift.
I am not sure why since I would not have thought it was part of her DNA to limit
the jurisdictional reach of American courts.
21. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
22. Id. at 884–87. New appointments to the Court may increase that number
to five or more.
23. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). That, at least arguably, makes my
continued teaching of that case rational!
24. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882. The meaning—and significance—of McIntyre
is obscured by the concurrence of Justices Breyer and Alito who joined in the
result but declined to join in the plurality’s reasoning. Id. at 887. These cases are
analyzed in John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global World: The Impact
of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1729–34 (2013); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context:
A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465 (2012) [hereinafter Miller,
McIntyre in Context]; Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here:
Cabining the Extraterritorial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705
(2014); Robert M. Pollack, Note, “Not of Any Particular State”: J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Nonspecific Purposeful Availment, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1088 (2014); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three
Opinions in J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481 (2012);
Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 417 (2012).
25. In a post-McIntyre Supreme Court specific jurisdiction decision, Walden
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125–26 (2014), the mere fact that the defendant was
travelling from Atlanta—where the challenged conduct occurred—to Nevada did
not allow jurisdiction to be asserted in Nevada; the decision adds little to the
understanding of the Court’s direction and probably should be limited to its
unusual facts. See also Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial
connection with the forum State.” (quoting from Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121)). See
generally Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine Around
Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore, 19 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 769 (2015) (suggesting the Court should “overhaul” personal
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Then last Term, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, San Francisco County,26 the Court held that California could
not constitutionally assert jurisdiction over non-residents whose claims
were not related to the defendant’s conduct within the forum state despite
the company’s extensive unconnected in-state activities and the presence
of California resident plaintiffs asserting identical claims. According to
the Court, “a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not
enough . . . . [W]hat is needed . . . is a connection between the forum and
the specific claims at issue.”27 Only Justice Sotomayor dissented, pointing
out:
What interests are served by preventing the consolidation of
claims and limiting the forums in which they can be consolidated?
The effect of the Court’s opinion today is to eliminate nationwide
mass actions in any state other than those in which a defendant is
“essentially at home.” . . . Such a rule hands one more tool to
corporate defendants determined to prevent the aggregation of
individual claims, and forces injured plaintiffs to bear the burden
of bringing suit in what will often be far flung jurisdictions.28
Bristol-Myers prevents potential plaintiffs who are from different
states from joining an action in a single state that has been brought by
claimants who reside in that forum. As a result, the ability of multiple
dispersed plaintiffs to aggregate their claims, or join multiple defendants
from different states, has been impaired, and may oblige them to bring
separate related actions in different fora regarding what sometimes even
may be identical claims. That obviously is inefficient and wasteful for both
courts and litigants, and is likely to produce inconsistent processing and
outcomes. Moreover, Bristol-Myers may make it especially difficult for
jurisdiction doctrine). In John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after
Bauman and Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607 (2015), the author argues
that Bauman and Walden dispose of the Nicastro plurality.
26. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
27. Id. at 1781. Of note, the Court’s opinion does not echo the sovereignty
thinking expressed in the McIntyre plurality opinion, and it left “open” the
question of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on a
federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction as apply to a state court under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1784.
28. Id. at 1789. She also wondered what effect the Court’s decision had on
multistate class and mass actions. See infra note 154. That issue has now arisen
in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Products
Liab. Litig., Civ. Ac. MDL No. 09-2047 (E.D. La. 2017) (Bristol-Myers does not
apply to class actions).
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claimants with small and overlapping claims who reside in less populous
states. Economic reality may mean that effectively there is no forum in
any state in which there are enough potential claimants to constitute a
critical mass of plaintiffs that can be aggregated.
I have no idea how often this contraction of the jurisdictional reach of
American courts over matters having a nexus to this country or to a
particular state will enable economic entities—domestic as well as
foreign—to create jurisdictional safe havens to the disadvantage of
plaintiffs without sufficient resources to chase possible wrongdoers. At a
minimum, the Court’s decisions have put the question of personal
jurisdiction “in play” more often than in the past, encouraging motions to
dismiss at a case’s threshold with attendant cost and delay. Long-arm
jurisdiction clearly is getting shorter.29
B. Pleading
Moving along the litigation timeline, the sudden appearance of
“plausibility” pleading is next on my list of procedural stop signs. The
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 and
its elaboration two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal31—two particular
objects of my concern about what is happening to the Gold Standard—
have reintroduced fact pleading by calling for a showing of “plausibility”
in a federal complaint and in those states that choose to follow the two
federal decisions. That development effectively authorizes fact evaluation
and possibly merit determinations on what for centuries has been purely a
law motion that simply asked whether the complaint “stated” a legally
cognizable claim. Whether that claim is “provable” or “trial-worthy” or
“for the jury” are questions that supposedly are to be left for later stages
29. If the shortening of the jurisdictional reach of American courts is coupled
with the Supreme Court’s presumption that federal substantive statutes do not
apply extraterritorially, the result may be to deprive many citizens and noncitizens of a domestic forum for challenging foreign conduct having an effect in
this country. E.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)
(Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act § 10(b)).
30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
31. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89 (2007) (per curiam), decided days after Twombly, the Court reversed a
dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint for failing to satisfy the Federal Rules’
pleading standard. The subsequent Iqbal decision, however, made clear that
Erickson was not a retreat from “plausibility pleading.” The complaint’s striking
facts made its sufficiency fairly obvious.
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of the litigation. These two decisions came out of the blue. One night I
went to sleep believing that I lived in the access-oriented world of notice
pleading, something repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court for 50
years.32 I woke up in a world of fact pleading. I felt as if I had been
transported back to New York’s 1848 Code of Procedure.33
The two decisions ignore the reality that at the outset of many cases
there is a significant information asymmetry between plaintiffs and
defendants, typically favoring defendants. Plaintiffs rarely know why a
complex machine malfunctioned or why a pharmaceutical appears to have
deleterious side effects. To make the demand for facts in the complaint
even more consequential, the Court said there can be no discovery—not
even “spotlight” or “pinpoint” discovery to help establish a claim’s
plausibility—until the plaintiff has pled a “plausible” case, which often
means not until the complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6).34 It is tantamount to telling a plaintiff: “You must plead what you
don’t know and the system won’t help you find anything out before it
dismisses you.”35 To me, Twiqbal—a quaint, but irreverent, shorthand for
32. See 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1215 (3d ed. 2004). Starting with Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), the Supreme Court repeatedly endorsed the notion of
simplified notice pleading. E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512
(2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
33. The Court’s reasoning and various critiques of it are discussed at length
in the materials cited infra notes 34–40.
34. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 665. The Court has been criticized sharply for
effectively amending Federal Rule 8(a) without following the rulemaking process
prescribed by statute. E.g., Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules,
Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 575 (2012)
(“The Supreme Court has acted lawlessly.”). Other commentators also have been
critical. See generally Edward D. Cavanuagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 877, 892 (2012)
(“Twombly has shifted the balance of power in federal court decidedly in favor of
defendants.”); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play
on the Federal Rules]; Alex Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility
Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008).
35. I think a more reasonable approach is that taken by the Ninth Circuit in
cases involving the analogous context of pleading fraud under Federal Rule 9(b)
in which that court has excused the failure to allege facts the plaintiff cannot
“reasonably be expected to have access,” Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1503
(9th Cir. 1995), or relaxed Rule 9(b) “as to matters within the opposing party’s
knowledge,” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir.
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the two cases—is inconsistent with a systemic commitment to getting to
and resolving a case on its merits.36 It appears to have resulted in lengthier,
over-inclusive, protracted pleadings as well as increased motions to
dismiss and appeals from dismissals that have to be decided on the basis
of a single document—the complaint—with no discovery, no summary
judgment, no trial, and no jury. There also is reason to believe that the
increased risks and burdens of “plausibility” pleading inhibit the
institution of cases that might have proven meritorious. Of course, it is
quite difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain whether that inhibition is real,
or how frequently it occurs, let alone figure out how many of those
unasserted claims might have proven meritorious.37
According to the majority opinion in Iqbal, “plausibility” is to be
judged by subjective and ambiguous factors such as “judicial experience”
and “common sense.”38 It defies reality to think that judges with radically
different educations, philosophical orientations, and social backgrounds
1989); see also Rubenstein v. Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C., 687 F. App’x 564
(9th Cir. 2017) (dismissal reversed because “without an opportunity to conduct
any discovery” the plaintiff “cannot reasonably be expected to have detailed
personal knowledge” of the defendant’s “internal pricing policies or procedures”
and thus “need not specifically plead facts to which she cannot ‘reasonably be
expected to have access’”).
36. See generally Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, supra note 34;
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, supra note 34; Alex
Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 1, 1–
2 (2012) (noting the change in pleading standards among lower courts). Before
the two Supreme Court decisions, I would quip in class that the last time a motion
to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) was granted was in the McKinley
administration. The fact that McKinley’s presidency ended 37 years before the
Rules were promulgated apparently never was noticed by the students.
37. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery,
Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE
L.J. 2270 (2012) (an attempt to measure the effects of Twombly on party
behavior); William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. 693 (2016) (a thought experiment by the author based on a
hypothetical pleading regime he creates).
38. Twombly and Iqbal have been characterized by some scholars in political
terms, employing words such as “judicial activism,” or as part of the “right/left”
dichotomy, or furthering “conservative” and “corporate” interests. See, e.g., Kevin
M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 850 (2010) (“Many observers . . . see the same old right/left
story: the conservatives seek to protect rich or powerful defendants, while the
liberals stand with the little plaintiffs.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (2010) (explaining that Twombly and Iqbal can be
read as favoring “corporate and business interests”).
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will have comparable “judicial experience” or “common sense.”39 Thus,
what has always been a motion addressed to a question of law now is
dependent on what lies in the eyes of the judicial beholder regarding the
pleaded facts, which lowers predictability, reduces the likelihood of
consistency of result, and engenders protraction.40 The desire to separate
litigation chaff from litigation wheat is understandable, but there are other,
more merit-preserving techniques than through a heightened pleading
requirement that can lead to premature termination.
C. Class Actions
Next, there has been a debilitation of the class action. To state the
obvious, the growth in class action practice following the 1966 amendment
of Federal Rule 23, which was designed to make the procedure more user
friendly, was revolutionary. Most of the Rules Advisory Committee
members wanted to create a mechanism for cases they believed would
profit from aggregate handling and intended to give the procedure enough
functionality and clarity to enable it to operate efficiently and fairly. As a
hedge against unknown future developments in the law and society, to be
cautious, and to protect absent class members, they wisely contained the
somewhat adventuresome Rule 23(b)(3) “damage” class action with
special procedural safeguards—requiring the common questions to
predominate over individual questions, insisting that the class action be
superior to other adjudicatory techniques, providing individual notice of
the action to identifiable absent class members, and giving the class
members a right to opt out. These procedures were imposed in addition to
the court’s obligation in all class actions to assure the adequacy of the class
representative, select class counsel, award counsel fees if the class is

39. This point was made forcefully by a former federal judge in Nancy Gertner,
A Judge Hangs Up Her Robes, 38 LITIG. 60, 61 (2012); see also Stephen B. Burbank,
Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109,
115 (2009) (“The discretionary power of the judge to follow his or her personal
preferences in deciding the plausibility of a complaint is enlarged to the extent that
direct allegations of liability-creating conduct can be thus disregarded.”).
40. In Adam N. Steinman, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading, 69
VAND. L. REV. 333 (2016), the author, a frequent commentator on pleading (as well
as my co-author), suggests that there are indications in post-Twiqbal Supreme Court
decisions that offer a way of preserving the pre-plausibility structure of notice
pleading regarding the limited judicial function on a motion to dismiss.
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successful, and approve the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a
settlement.41
Surely the Committee members could not have foreseen what was to
come in the following decades: the explosive recognition of new
substantive rights by federal and state statutes and judicial activity; the
wide-angle invocation of the class action for civil rights and other public
interest purposes; the enlarged dimension, scope, and economic stakes of
many class actions; and the frequency—let alone the character—of
product and commercial failures and other adverse events that would give
rise to aggregate litigation.42 That combination of forces created a perfect
storm for generating unprecedented class action activity. Depending on
one’s perspective and attitude regarding the class action as well as the
character of the cases invoking the procedure, the result of the
Committee’s labors can be viewed positively or negatively. All would
agree, however, that the world of class actions was completely
transformed following the 1966 revision.
Class action practice expanded dramatically in the years following
1966. It became the procedural vehicle of choice across a wide range of
substantive fields43 and was recognized as the best—often the only—way

41. Much of the history of the process that produced the 1966 revision of Rule
23 is recounted in John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were
We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 333–45 (2005). See generally 7AA
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1777-84.1, 1804–05 (3d ed. 2005); An Oral
History of Rule 23: An Interview of Professor Arthur R. Miller by Professor Samuel
Issacharoff, Ctr. on Civil Justice Papers 1 (2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites
/default/files/ICCVCJUS17.1-CCJ%20Rule%2023%4050%20Booklet%20Project
_RELEASE.pdf [https://perma.cc/P39R-VF4W].
42. My co-author on the Federal Practice and Procedure treatise, who was
part of the rulemaking process at the time of the revision, expressed the opinion
that not many Federal Rule 23(b)(3) cases would materialize. Charles Alan
Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552, 567
(1966). Three years later Charlie confessed error. Charles Alan Wright, Class
Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969). The caution in the Advisory Committee Note
accompanying the revised rule that a “mass accident . . . is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action” seems quaint in retrospect given what has happened
since 1966. As a percipient witness to events both in the Advisory Committee
meetings and as a result of numerous contacts with Committee members and the
Reporter outside of meetings, I can say—with a touch of nostalgia—you had to
be there to appreciate how that passage in the Note came into being.
43. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (antitrust);
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discrimination); Dunn v.
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to pursue a remedy for small claims that were not economically viable on
an individual basis.44 The procedure was employed by both public interest
and entrepreneurial lawyers to challenge various forms of discrimination,
enforce public policies, pursue compensation for various economic
injuries, and remedy a wide range of other types of misconduct that
impacted large groups of people. Some commentators have referred to this
period as a “Golden Age” of class actions.45 But every action breeds a
reaction, and eventually resistance to class actions intensified, especially
in the mass tort and physical injury contexts.46 A polarized and contentious
debate set in, which continues to this day,47 often accompanied by
proposals for further revision of Rule 23 and other facets of complex
litigation.48
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting rights); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291 (2d Cir. 1968) (securities).
44. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The amount-in-controversy requirement in
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) limited the class action’s utility in diversity of citizenship
cases. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (requiring that each
class member in a Rule 23(b)(3) action satisfy the diversity of citizenship statute’s
amount-in-controversy requirement). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546 (2005), the Court concluded that the enactment of the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, effectively overruled Zahn. The enactment of the
Class Action Fairness Act has largely eliminated the amount in controversy issue in
diversity-based class actions. See infra notes 58–61.
45. See Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in
the Twenty-First Century, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 499–504 (2016) [hereinafter
Marcus, Bending in the Breeze] (supporting the belief that aggregate litigation
will continue); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them:
Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 404 (2014) (proposing
a more limited role for class litigation) [hereinafter Mullenix, Ending Class
Actions as We Know Them].
46. A group of virtually simultaneous court of appeals decisions rejecting the
certification of personal injury classes were instrumental in turning the tide.
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996) (epilepsy drug);
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (tobacco addiction); In
re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (defective penile implants);
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (contaminated blood supply).
47. I naively tried to calm the waters. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein
Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
48. The Rule has been amended several times since 1966. Additional
amendments are now working their way through the rulemaking process. See COMM.
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 25–
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That Golden Age is long over. The Supreme Court’s decisions in WalMart Stores Inc. v. Dukes,49 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,50 Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,51 and other cases52 have made class certification and
27 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JE7-R86L]. They are not major. One of the most inventive
academic proposals is to reconceptualize the class as an entity and focus on the
adequacy of its representation. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). Some issues never seem to be
definitively resolved. For example, more than 50 years after it was decided that Rule
23(b)(3) class actions should be opt-out in character, some scholars continue to
advocate they be opt-in or that such a possibility be available in particular cases. See,
e.g., Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171
(2016); Mullenix, Ending Class Actions, supra note 45, at 441; see also John
Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 903
(2005) (advocating limiting class settlements to those who consent to them by opting
in).
49. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). But cf. id. at 375
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with
the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry
so that it is no longer ‘easily satisfied.’”). Although Rule 23 establishes different
categories of class actions, some evidence exists that cases like Wal-Mart seem to
obscure the differences between and among them, sometimes making certification
even more difficult to achieve. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE
L.J. 843 (2016) (arguing that courts should engage in a broader analysis that takes into
account all of the subtypes described in the class-action rule).
50. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
51. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
52. There have been other negative class action decisions by the Court. E.g.,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (determining the court of
appeals failed to apply a proper injury-in-fact or concreteness standard in a Fair
Credit Reporting Act case), on remand, 867 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that an inaccurate website report alleged a sufficiently concrete injury),
cert denied, 138 S.Ct. 931 (2018), 2018 WL 491554; Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (upholding a no-class-action-or-classarbitration clause despite the obvious economic unviability of individual litigation
or arbitration); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 35–38 (2013)
(determining plaintiffs’ expert regression model was not acceptable to show
damages on a class-wide basis for purposes of establishing predominance); AT&T
Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 536 U.S. 333, 340, 351–52 (2011) (enforcing a
no-class-action arbitration clause despite California law on contract
unconscionability). Most recently, in California Pub. Emps.’ Retirement Sys. v.
ANZ Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017), the Court applied the three-year repose
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012), applicable to actions under § 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa, to bar the claim of a class member
who opted out after three years to bring its own action. Four Justices dissented.

2018]

WHAT ARE COURTS FOR?

757

settlement approval more difficult to secure and generated procedures that
have become very labor and resource intensive. Courts not only demand
“rigorous” adherence to the Rule 23 requirements, particularly
predominance,53 but also explore merit issues when they are intertwined
with any of the certification requirements.54 It is somewhat ironic that

The effect of the decision is to compromise the “constitutionally shielded,” ANZ
Secs., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2057 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting), opt-out right when it is
exercised after the repose period expires either because the court denies class
certification or the class member learns of a settlement proposal he deems
inadequate after the time limitation has run. The ANZ Secs. decision may
encourage class members to file protective actions to preserve their individual
litigation option, further complicating global resolution of disputes. Some
decisions by the Court have been more hospitable. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046–47 (2016) (allowing sample evidence as to
employee practices in a Fair Labor Standards Act case to establish predominance);
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (determining that a
consumer class complaint under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
challenging advertising use of a third party’s involvement in unsolicited text
messages was not rendered moot by an unaccepted offer of judgment).
53. The Supreme Court demanded a “rigorous analysis” initially in Gen. Tel.
Co. Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). It has been repeated as catechism many
times since. E.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2412 (2014) (noting plaintiffs must “prove each requirement of Rule 23, including
. . . predominance”); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., L.L.C., 687 F.3d 583, 592, 594,
596–97, 605 (3d Cir. 2012) (reversing class certification and demanding higher
factual proof of the class definition, class ascertainability, numerosity, and
causation); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir.
2008) (remanding certification because the district court seemingly departed from
the “rigorous analysis” standard); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom,
Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 23’s requirements must be given their
full weight independent of the merits.”), abrogated on other grounds by Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007) (“rigorous” analysis showed that differences in
various aspects of states’ laws meant that common questions did not predominate);
In re Initial Pub. Offerings Secs. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (class
certification requires a ruling on each Rule 23 requirement regardless of any overlap
with merit issues); McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545 (5th Cir.
2003) (individual issues of reliance precluded certification on various theories).
54. See, e.g., Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 35–36 (damage measurement);
Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 1076, 1077 (7th Cir. 2013)
(determining statute of limitations issue relevant to class certification); In re Rail
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding
scrutiny of damage model relevant to class certification); Szabo v. Bridgeport
Machs, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that when there is an overlap
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many of the protections for absentees the rulemakers crafted in the 1966
revision have become burdensome points of contention on the certification
motion.
Moreover, defense lawyers and litigants who generally find
themselves on the right side of the “v.” in class actions, as well as some
courts, have exerted pressure to impose new procedural requirements that
are not prescribed in the Rule, such as demanding the ascertainability of
every class member when certification is sought,55 even though that does
not seem necessary and is not particularly useful until the case is resolved,
between the merits and Rule 23(b)(3) issues, “[T]he judge must make a preliminary
inquiry into the merits.”).
55. The courts of appeals are divided on whether there is a heightened
ascertainability requirement, although the trend seems to be going against
recognizing it. Compare In re Petrobras Secs., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“[W]e decline to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that requires a
showing of administrative feasibility at the class certification stage” because it is
not consistent with Rule 23.); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121,
1123 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (not requiring class
proponents to demonstrate that it is administratively feasible to identify class
members); Sandusky Wellness Ctr., L.L.C. v. Medfox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992,
996 (8th Cir. 2016); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (deeming objective criteria such as online
sales, receipts, and identification by physicians sufficient); Mullins v. Direct
Digital, Inc., 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016)
(rejecting heightened ascertainability), with Byrd v. Aarons, Inc., 784 F.3d 154,
162–63 (3d Cir. 2015) (requiring the class to provide a “reliable and
administratively feasible” method for determining membership); Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310, 312 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting class of purchasers of an
inexpensive over-the-counter product for lack of ascertainability); Karhu v. Vital
Pharmacies, Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949–51 (11th Cir. 2015) (requiring objective
criteria for identification). See also City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of
N. Am., Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Affidavits, in combination with
records or other reliable and administratively feasible means, can meet the
ascertainability standard.”). See generally Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class
Action Limits: Parsing Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Press, 65 U. KAN.
L. REV. 913, 913–39 (2017); Sarah R. Cansler, An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to
Class Action Certification? The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement's Effect
on Small Consumer Claims, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016); Geoffrey C. Shaw,
Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354 (2015). The Advisory Committee
considered the ascertainability question for almost three years but abandoned
further consideration of the subject. See Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective
of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017). If enacted, the Fairness in Class Action
Litigation Act of 2017, H. Rep. 985, 115th Cong. (2017), discussed infra note 66,
would demand heightened ascertainability.
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or requiring a showing that each class member has been injured56 and is
seeking the same remedy. There also has been pressure to eliminate the socalled “it ain’t worth it” actions or those actions that might result in overdeterrence or overcompensation—matters that seem highly speculative at
the certification stage.57
56. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–50 (holding plaintiff must show an injury
in fact that is concrete and particularized), on remand, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2017) (concluding that website inaccuracies concerning age, marital status,
educational background, and employment concrete for Fair Credit Reporting Act
standing); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding
that there was a substantial risk of injury from a data breach); In re: SuperValu,
Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017) (data breach was not shown to create a
“substantial risk” of injury); Eike v. Allergen, Inc., 850 F.3d 315, 318 (7th Cir.
2017) (finding regret or disappointment about a product is not injury for standing
purposes). Thus far the courts only have required that the named representatives
show a cognizable injury to satisfy the standing-to-sue requirement. See In re:
SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763; In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 802 (5th
Cir. 2014); see also Phillips, 736 F.3d 1076. See generally Joshua P. Davis, Eric
L. Cramer & Caitlin V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured
Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858 (2014). However, these decisions preceded
the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549, in which the Court
said that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
statutory violation.” Since then a number of courts have dismissed actions under
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1), which
limits the number of credit card digits that can be included on receipts, because
the only injury alleged was an increased risk of identity theft. The courts
concluded that a bare allegation to that effect lacked a “degree of risk sufficient
to meet the concreteness requirement.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. See, e.g.,
Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Perre, L.L.C., 843 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2016);
Hendrick v. Aramark Corp., 2017 WL 1397241 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2017). There
are similar decisions under other statutes. See, e.g., Hancock v. Urban Outfitters,
Inc., 830 F.3d 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (District of Columbia Consumer Protection
Procedures Act). Compare Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336,
1337 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding disclosure of a consumer’s personal information
was a sufficiently concrete injury to provide standing under the Video Privacy
Protection Act, but the action was dismissed because downloading the defendant’s
app for free did not make the plaintiff a statutory “subscriber”), with Cole v. Gene
by Gene, Ltd., 2017 WL 2838256, at *4–5 (D. Alaska June 30, 2017) (finding
disclosure of plaintiff’s DNA satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement). The proposed
Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act, described in note 66, infra, has a demanding
injury requirement.
57. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 235 (9th Cir.
1974) (applying the standard used in Ratner, cited below, to Sherman and Clayton
Act actions); Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal.
2012), aff’d in part, 583 F. App’x 803 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining certification
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In addition, when Congress became more conservative and responsive
to business interests, corporate and other defense groups secured the 2005
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)58—a misnomer if
would limit Laguna Beach’s “ability to protect the health, safety and welfare of
the city”); Leysoto v. Mama Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 697 (S.D. Fla 2009)
(holding that a class action was not “superior” for purposes of satisfying Rule
23(b)(3) “in light of the potentially annihilating” damages it might inflict); Shields
v. First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972) (determining
potential $100 million class recovery was grossly disproportionate given that the
class members had suffered no damage and the defendant had gained little benefit;
such a recovery is a “possibly annihilating punishment”); Ratner v. Chem. Bank
N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (expressing concern that a
class action might inflict “horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,
unrelated to any damage”). But see Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 23(b) does not permit consideration of the
proportionality of liability to actual harm and reversing a denial of class
certification); Murray v. GMAC Mort. Corp., 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that defendant’s potential enormous liability is an impermissible
factor in a Rule 23(b) superiority analysis). A proposal to add a Rule 23(b)(3)(F)
to the effect that the court consider “whether the probable relief to individual class
members justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation” on a motion to certify
under Rule 23(b)(3) was offered to the bench and bar by the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee in the 1990s. It was almost universally opposed and dropped by the
Committee. For a glimpse into some reactions to that proposal, see COMM. ON
RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, FED. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
R EPORT OF THE A DVISORY C OMMITTEE ON C IVIL R ULES 36–38 (1997),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VLK-LQTQ]; see also Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future
of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 937–46 (1998) (discussing the arguments
for and against the proposal); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the
Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 621–22 (1997)
(suggesting the proposal might violate the Rules Enabling Act).
58. Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715. With
certain very limited exceptions, the Act embraces all class and “mass” actions
with 100 or more members with claims having an aggregate value exceeding
$5,000,000 and only requires minimal diversity of citizenship. Unfortunately, the
statute does nothing to reduce the stringency with which the class certification
prerequisites have been applied by the federal courts in recent decades in multijurisdictional diversity-based class actions or ameliorate the difficult choice-oflaw issues caused by differences in state law those cases often raise. See, e.g.,
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2012) (decertifying a
nationwide class because the law of all states would have to be applied); Cole v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding differences in state laws
meant predominance not satisfied); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085
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ever there was one. The Act virtually federalizes class actions of any
substantial dimension, thereby marginalizing involvement by state
courts.59 In my view, it is a blatant affront to federalism.60 But there is an
irony. By alleviating certain historic subject matter jurisdiction limitations
to capture these cases in the federal courts, such as the complete diversity
of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements applicable in nonclass diversity cases, the Act has enabled the aggregation of modest
monetary state law claims so that an array of matters that previously could
not have been brought as class actions in federal court now can be, which
is particularly significant in the consumer protection field.61
In my judgment, the class action now has reduced effectiveness in
several respects. It has less utility as a means of promoting the private
enforcement of important public policies, particularly in the civil rights
and employment fields, which supplements government enforcement. Its
efficacy as a deterrent to large-scale wrongdoing has decreased. Its
usefulness as a remedial mechanism for compensating those injured by
public or private wrongs has been compromised. And finally, to some
extent, elements of the plaintiffs’ bar have been discouraged from acting

(6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying nationwide products liability class action because the
negligence law of 50 states would be impossible to be applied as would instructing
the jury); Powers v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 892 F.R.D. 313 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (same).
See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 41, § 1780.1; Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After
the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006); Larry Kramer,
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996); Arthur R.
Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1 (1986).
59. State law class actions still may be brought in state court if they fall within
one of the limited exceptions in CAFA permitting that, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)–
(4), the defendant fails to remove, or if a federal court has declined to certify. See
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011).
60. For an excellent analysis of the relationship between preemption and
federalism, see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006).
61. See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2008) (discussing the expansion of federal subject
matter jurisdiction over class actions); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action
Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdiction Reform,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008) (analyzing CAFA’s centralizing impact on
American law and government).
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as private attorneys general and some of its members have become
extremely risk averse.62
The procedural rigors that now burden class action certification
obviously weigh particularly heavily on plaintiffs. The reality is that
today’s judicial treatment of the class action has made pursuing
certification a time-consuming and expensive process, one that often is
nearly or completely impossible to navigate successfully, leading some
knowledgeable scholars to question the long-term viability of the
procedure.63 I, however, disagree with their calamitous forebodings; to
paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of class actions are “greatly
exaggerated.”64 In some parts of the country and in certain substantive
62. See generally David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO.
L.J. 777 (2016) (noting that public interest classes are not being certified today
for reasons that would have been nearly unimaginable a decade ago); Arthur R.
Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296–300 (2014) [hereinafter Miller, Preservation
and Rejuvenation] (describing the current difficulties of securing class
certification). Questions about the legitimacy and utility of private enforcement
have been part of the class-action debate. One negative frequently asserted is that
private enforcement occasionally creates a risk of over-deterrence or overenforcement, particularly when there has been a small or technical violation of a
statutory scheme that affects a large number of people in some marginal way. See
generally Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 45, at 520–30. That has led
to a denial of certification in some cases. See the citations supra note 57.
63. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L.
REV. 161 (2015); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming NearTotal Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005)
(asserting that class actions will soon be “virtually extinct”); Robert H. Klonoff,
The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013) (providing an
excellent description of the then current state of affairs); four years later the author
was somewhat more optimistic: Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A
Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017); Georgene Vairo, Is the
Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY
L.J. 477, 528 (2014) (“[C]lass actions . . . have taken a huge hit.”); see also
MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009) (arguing that class actions
undermine foundational constitutional principles); Mullenix, Ending Class
Actions, supra note 45; Martin H. Redish, Rethinking the Theory of the Class
Action: The Risks and Rewards of Capitalistic Socialism in the Litigation Process,
64 EMORY L.J. 451, 462 (2014) (arguing that class attorneys should be viewed as
the fiduciary or guardian of the absent class members).
64. Class action litigation, it turns out, is hard to kill off. See Linda S.
Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 516 (2013); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel
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contexts, class actions actually appear to flourish, although in others they
languish or are stillborn. Despite the gloomy picture painted above, a few
years ago I expressed the view that “there are some rays of light that
indicate it will survive.”65 I stubbornly repeat that belief.
The pessimistic views are either understandable expressions of
frustration, possibly tinged with a touch of despair, or wishful thinking
depending on the speaker’s or writer’s point of view. Objectively viewed,
however, the demise of the class action would be completely at odds with
the litigation system’s contemporary needs. In today’s world, a procedural
system cannot function with a reasonable degree of efficiency by
processing a substantial number of overlapping or related claims one-byone. Abandonment of the class action and other multi-party consolidation
devices is not a reasonable option. Not only is effective aggregate
litigation a matter of common sense, it is a matter of the rational utilization
of litigant and judicial system resources. That efficiency is in everyone’s
interest. Nonetheless, a bill has passed the House of Representatives that
would further burden class actions in very significant ways and probably
extinguish or dim the “rays of light” to which I referred.66
One reason for optimism is the willingness of some federal judges in
recent years to employ the passage in Rule 23(c)(4), stating that “when
Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (2017)
(describing how the class action is getting a second life). Actions under Rule
23(b)(1) to avoid prejudice always were thought to be the exception not the rule
and have not figured prominently in the class action debate; actions under Rule
23(b)(2) for injunctions primarily to stop discrimination or public policy
violations also have largely avoided the brunt of the controversy.
65. Miller, Preservation and Rejuvenation, supra note 62, at 306. Professor
Richard Marcus, who is my co-author on the Federal Practice and Procedure
treatise and an Associate Reporter of the current Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, echoes my thought in his text, Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note
45. I hope we are not travelling down a primrose path. If the reader has patience,
perhaps the “rays of light” I perceive will become apparent.
66. The Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th
Cong. (2017). The bill cleared the House in days without any hearings or public
discussion. Among other things it would require an affirmative demonstration that
“each” class member “suffered the same type and scope of injury,” that class
members be ascertainable, that attorney’s fees be limited to a reasonable
percentage of the monies “directly distributed” to class members and postpone
payment of fees until the distribution to class members has been “completed,”
eliminate issue classes, and postpone discovery until various motions, including
the motion to dismiss, have been decided. Id. Simply put, the legislation would
cripple class action practice. So, one might ask for whom would the proposed
“Fairness Act” provide “fairness.”
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appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues.” Admittedly, the provision is ambiguous as to
whether it is an independent basis for class certification or presupposes
that all other prerequisites, most notably predominance in Rule 23(b)(3),
must be satisfied before the court can treat one or more issues on an
aggregate basis, leaving the remaining issues for individual treatment.67
The former construction, creating what now is called single-issue
certification, has been gaining traction.
A good example is Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co.68—a product defect
consumer class action involving mold in washing machines. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a denial of certification of one of
two separate classes that advanced two different breach-of-warranty
theories. The opinion is very pragmatic, focusing on the need for courts to
handle partially overlapping cases efficiently. Judge Richard Posner,
writing for the court, concluded that the central liability question of
whether the washing machines were defective could be determined on a

67. The ambiguity is exemplified by two 1996 court of appeals decisions that
expressed opposite views on the point. Compare Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if the common questions do not
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire
action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to
isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class
treatment of these particular issues.”), with Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d
734, 745–46, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The proper interpretation of the
interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a
whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3).”). It is unclear
whether Castano’s rejection of single-issue certification is still good law in the
Fifth Circuit. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014).
Another unclear decision is Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417,
441–43 (4th Cir. 2003). The subject has attracted considerable academic interest.
See generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 41, § 1790; Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855 (2015);
Laura J. Hines, Codifying the Issue Class Action, 16 NEV. L.J. 625 (2016); Jon
Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification
of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (2002);
Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121 (2015).
68. Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); see also In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading
Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 839 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
class action prerequisites were satisfied in a related washing machine mold case),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).
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class-wide basis, leaving damage matters to individual proceedings if
liability were established.69
In 2014, a year after the Butler decision, the Seventh Circuit reiterated
its receptivity to the aggregate adjudication of portions of identical
consumer claims in In re IKO Roofing Shingle Products Liability
Litigation,70 when it again vacated a denial of class certification in another
home products case. The court of appeals rejected the district court’s
conclusion that “commonality of damages” among class members was
“legally indispensable.”71 The class’s two theories of damages both
matched its liability theory. The IKO panel acknowledged, but was not
concerned, that one of the damage theories would require buyer-specific
hearings and could not be handled on a class-wide basis in the event the
common liability questions were established in the class’s favor; it simply
cited Butler.72
These two decisions show that some judges are willing to employ the
class action whenever the determination of one or more significant classwide issues will meaningfully advance the litigation’s resolution.73 Other
69. Butler, 727 F.3d at 801–02. Judge Posner’s Butler opinion can be traced
back to his earlier opinion in MacReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (allowing certification of the issue
whether the defendant’s practices had a discriminatory effect). His earlier opinion
in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 867 (1995), was far less accepting of single-issue certification.
70. In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2014).
71. Id. at 603.
72. Id. The Seventh Circuit explicitly embraced this view in Suchanek v.
Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014), another consumer products case
reversing the district court’s denial of class certification. See also Parko v. Shell
Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014) (cautioning that the common issue
must “greatly simplify the litigation” to avoid creating risks).
73. The materially-advance approach also has been approved by the Manual
for Complex Litigation and the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 21.24 (4th ed. 2004); AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (2010). Sometimes, it is difficult to determine
whether the court is deciding the certification question on the basis of the
existence of a meaningful common single issue or because some other Rule 23
prerequisite, such as predominance, is satisfied. For example, in Johnson v. Nextel
Commc’ns, Inc., 780 F.3d 128, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2015), a failure to satisfy the
materially-advance standard was characterized as a lack of both predominance
and superiority. In Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 602 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2015), the
court upheld certification on the basis of “liability” being common but spoke in
terms of predominance, which a single issue occasionally can satisfy.
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courts have accepted single-issue certification but have used different
formulations for deciding when it is appropriate to do so.74 This singleissue class action concept, if it is ultimately accepted by the Supreme Court
and survives the current threat of being legislatively overruled by
Congress,75 holds great promise for proceeding on an aggregate basis in
the future in various substantive contexts.76
74. See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2014)
(stating common antitrust questions of conspiracy and impact “drive the
resolution of litigation” (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
350 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655
F.3d 255, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2011) (accepting the concept of single-issue
certification and offering numerous factors for determining when it is appropriate
to use it); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008)
(indicating that a single issue must “materially advance the litigation”); In re
Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing
certification of a single issue relating to the propriety of strip searches); cf. In re St.
Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2008). Another case in the same vein,
although not phrased in single-issue terms, is Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241
(11th Cir. 2004), which held that a common question in a Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organization action predominated. Other cases recognize single-issue
certification but decline to employ it because of the circumstances of the particular
case. E.g., Gates, 655 F.3d 255; McLaughlin, 522 F.3d 215; Valentino v. CarterWallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). Also, Judge Pryor’s opinion for an en
banc court in Graham v. R.J. Reynolds, Tobacco Co., 782 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir.
2015), seems quite accepting of issue classes, liability-only class determinations,
and bifurcation.
75. If enacted, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985,
115th Cong. § 1.03 (2017), described supra note 66, would prohibit certifying any
issue under Rule 23(c)(4) unless all class action certification requirements are
satisfied with regard to the entirety of the cause of action from which the issue
arises, effectively overruling Butler and IKO. As resistance to class action
certification has increased and the burdens associated with that process have
magnified in the United States, class-action-like and other aggregation procedures
have developed in many other nations. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, From
Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading Globally, 65 U.
KAN. L. REV. 965 (2017). This is somewhat ironic because in the Golden Age of
the American class action many around the globe took pleasure in saying at
conferences or in private conversation that our practice under Rule 23 was quite
irresponsible and unacceptable.
76. The subcommittee of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee appointed to
evaluate and propose amendments to Rule 23 undertook a consideration of singleissue classes, but abandoned the subject after almost two years. See ADVISORY
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 87 (Nov. 5-6, 2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committeerules-civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/VD4J-6N3Z].
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D. Discovery
Another illustration of the stop-sign phenomenon relates to discovery,
which no longer is fully committed to providing litigants equal access to
all relevant data as was the original objective of the Rules promulgated in
1938. There have been sequential restrictions on it by Federal Rule
amendments over the past 40 years,77 including redefining the scope of
discovery, reducing its availability, and creating presumptive limits on its
use. Additionally, the most recent amendment imposes a new
“proportionality” requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) to be applied by
“considering” six factors, a few of which are quite amorphous or subjective.
Some observers are concerned that this latest linguistic change creates an
additional restraint on the availability of discovery. Its significance is yet to
be seen.78 At a minimum, “proportionality” shows signs of producing a fair
77. Since 1983 almost all the amendments to the Federal Rules relating to
discovery have encouraged judges to contain the process. See Arthur R. Miller,
Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
353–56 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure]. It seems
fairly obvious that discovery restrictions can impact other procedural and
substantive policies and should be undertaken cautiously. Broad access to discovery
is often a necessity in lawsuits under federal substantive statutes and other matters
of public policy because in those contexts, we often are especially dependent on
litigation to augment governmental enforcement of federal normative standards.
Events in both the financial and real estate markets during the last severe recession,
for example, have laid bare the consequences of under-enforcement of federal
regulatory policies. It seems odd, therefore, to impede the efficacy of private
enforcement of national as well as state policies by limiting discovery. Discovery is
often the key that opens the door to information critical to remediating violations
of important constitutional, statutory, and common law principles. See generally
Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981)
(explaining that discovery is essential to “the evolution of substantive law”).
78. See David Crump, Goodbye, “Reasonably Calculated,” You’re Replaced
by “Proportionality”: Deciphering the New Federal Scope of Discovery, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2016) (“[T]he criterion of ‘relevance’ is intentionally
demoted in importance.”); Patricia H. Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant
Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083
(2016) (opining that proportionality will likely further restrict the ability to obtain
information). A more optimistic view—I hope it is not wishful thinking—is
offered in Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After
the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 28–33 (2016) (arguing that the 2015
amendments are unlikely to alter practice under the Federal Rules significantly).
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amount of motion practice.79 Although individually these amendments
might not represent a dramatic undermining of federal discovery,
collectively they clearly look in a philosophically different direction than
did the original rules, which allowed discovery of anything “relevant to
the subject matter of the action” and were designed to operate in a simple,
self-executing way.80
Some courts have quoted the Chief Justice’s enthusiastic—some might say
overstated—description of the amendment, even though his remarks are not part
of the Rule itself. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/public
info/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf (“The amendments may not look like a big
deal at first glance, but they are.”) [https://perma.cc/KU69-JBC3]. A recent
canvas of the cases under the new discovery rules in the class action context by a
distinguished proceduralist who was involved in drafting the new rules suggest
no significant changes in governing principles has taken place. Robert H. Klonoff,
Application of the New Discovery Rules in Class Actions: Much Ado About
Nothing, 71 VAND. L. REV. ___ (2018).
79. See, e.g., Panel Specialists, Inc. v. Tenawa Haven Processing, L.L.C.,
2017 WL 3503354, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 2017) (concluding that a request for
specific information concerning the markups charged other customers was not
proportional to the needs of the case and would burden a small, family-owned
company; the magistrate judge thought it was a close case); In re Bard IVC Filters
Prods. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016) (stating that the
proportionality inquiry “requires input from both sides”); Hibu, Inc. v. Peck, 2016
WL 4702422, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016), review denied, 2016 WL 6462044
(D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2016) (“Moving the proportionality provisions to Rule 26 does
not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all
proportionality considerations . . . .”); Jackson v. E-Z-GO Div. of Textron, Inc.,
2016 WL 6211719, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2016) (finding that compelled
discovery of “information from former counsel, information from independent
third parties that currently perform services for Defendants, and claims that may
involve one of the four design features of concern” was not disproportionate);
Robertson v. People Magazine, 2015 WL 9077111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015)
(“[T]he 2015 amendment does not create a new standard; rather it serves to exhort
judges to exercise their preexisting control over discovery more exactingly. . . .”).
80. It is generally acknowledged that in routine litigation, discovery is
modest—often nonexistent—in keeping with the dimension of the case, and
usually does not require judicial supervision. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY:
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 2 (2009) (discussing findings from a survey of attorneys regarding
discovery in recently closed civil cases); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E.
WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ATTORNEY SATISFACTION WITH THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2010).
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E. Expert Witnesses
Hearings to qualify expert witnesses have proliferated and become
protracted. This shift is primarily because of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,81 which in the name of
judicial gatekeeping—admittedly a worthy objective—has made expert
qualification for testimonial purposes on economic, scientific, and
technical matters more difficult to achieve and a major procedural obstacle
with attendant risks, costs, and delays. On occasion, the Daubert hearing
has become a trial within a trial. This process most likely burdens plaintiffs
more heavily than defendants and, of course, is yet another pretrial stop
sign. Indeed, given the importance of expert testimony in many types of
cases, the Daubert hearing can amount to a “Road Closed”—not merely a
temporary “stop”—sign.
F. Summary Judgment
Finally, resort to the summary judgment motion clearly has increased
in recent times; when the motion is granted, it operates as a terminal stop

81. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Two other cases
complete the Daubert trilogy. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158
(1999) (applying Daubert to a tire failure expert witnesses); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
exclusion of scientific epidemiological expert testimony). See generally Andrew B.
Gagen, What is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner and
Kumho Tire on the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 401, 447 (2002) (discussing the broad impact of the Daubert trilogy on
environmental litigation); Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden Significance of Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Compass for Problems of Definition and Procedure
Created by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603, 646
(2000) (emphasizing how the broad discretion given to judges as “gatekeepers”
creates inconsistency in results); Christopher B. Hockett, Geraldine M. Alexis &
Christina M. Wheeler, Revisiting the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Antitrust
Cases, 15 ANTITRUST 7 (2001) (finding that after Kumho Tire’s application of
Daubert to soft sciences, challenges frequently succeed even against highly
qualified experts, and can involve extensive evidentiary hearings). Most states have
adopted the Daubert approach, but recently the Florida Supreme Court rejected
inserting it as a rule in the Florida Evidence Code because of “grave concerns about
the constitutionality of the amendment” in terms of its possible effect on the jurytrial right and access to the courts. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Evidence Code,
210 So. 3d 1231, 1239 (2017).
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sign.82 Indeed, it was the 1986 Supreme Court decisions in Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett,83 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,84 and Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,85—the so-called summary judgment
trilogy—that began the procedural retrenchment I am describing. The
opinions in these cases appear to have encouraged heightened invocation
of the motion by establishing a nebulous “plausibility” standard that, like
the previously discussed pleading “plausibility” standard governing
motions to dismiss, seems to promote fact-finding and evidence-weighing
by judges. As is true of the motion to dismiss, a summary judgment motion
will be decided on the basis of judicial subjectivity and a paper record—
sometimes an obscenely large one—not live testimony subject to crossexamination, let alone a trial with a jury.86 Thus, a motion historically
82. See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts,
4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 896 (2007) (showing an increase in motions
made from 12% to 21% of the sample cases from 1975 to 2000 and an increase in
the grant rate from 6% to 12% in those years); Joe S. Cecil, Trends in Summary
Judgment Practice: A Summary of Findings, 1 FJC DIRECTIONS 11, 16–17, 19
n.10 (1991) (discussing the increase in summary judgment motions filed, opining
that the increase may be because of increased dispositions of asbestos cases). See
generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court
and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1074–1132, 1048–57
(2003) [hereinafter Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment].
83. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
84. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
85. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
86. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). This highly controversial decision,
see Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going
to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837 (2009), is exhaustively analyzed in Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris and
the Future of Summary Judgment, 15 NEV. L.J. 1351 (2015). Professor Wolff
expresses concern that the Scott opinion has destabilized the historic presumption in
favor of the non-moving party, as well as the practice of looking at the record in the
light most favorable to that party, and has inappropriately permitted interlocutory
review of a denial of the motion. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N.
Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401–02 (2011); Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note
82, at 1074–1132 (evaluating the importance of oral testimony and jury trial); Nathan
S. Richard, Judicial Resolution of EMTALA Screening Claims at Summary Judgment,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 591, 635 (2012) (“The frequent inability of plaintiffs suing under
. . . [the Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act] to survive a summary
judgment has substantially curtailed the Act’s capacity to remedy and deter disparities
in emergency-department screenings. At summary judgment, many federal courts . . .
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designed solely to determine whether a case is trial-worthy or resolvable
by the court as a matter of law has been transmogrified into a judge’s
subjective exploration of the claim’s “plausibility.”
The concern is that the motion may now be used to dispose of cases
that previously might have been considered trial-worthy because the
record revealed a “genuine dispute as to [a] . . . material fact,” in theory
the only issue to be decided on a summary judgment motion according to
Federal Rule 56 and its many state counterparts. That result, I believe,
contravenes our commitment to a right to a meaningful day in court,
elements of due process, and trial by jury when applicable.87 Because the
motion is primarily a defense weapon, it is not surprising that it is invoked
primarily by defendants. Moreover, the process of making, responding,
and adjudicating the motion has become protracted, resource consumptive,
and, when granted, vulnerable to reversal on appeal. One suspects that in
many instances it might be more efficient to try the case, raising the
are highly deferential to the assertions, judgments, and perceptions of treating
physicians. To the extent that this practice constitutes a ‘weighing of the evidence,’ it
amounts to an aggressive, if not improper, use of summary judgment.”).
87. See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 310–12
(observing that what is being decided “as a matter of law” has been enlarged);
Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 82, at 1062–72, 1074–77 (arguing
that the summary judgment trilogy has promoted paper trials); David L. Shapiro,
The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summary Judgment in the Administration of
Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 359, 386–87 (Kevin M. Clermont ed.,
2d ed. 2008) (summarizing the tension between summary judgment and
constitutional concerns); see also John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 539–43 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is
inherently pro-defendant); Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We
Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 709–
10 (2012) (discussing the high rate of summary judgment grants in favor of
defendants); Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the
Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV 193 (2014); cf. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct.
1861, 1866 (2014) (reaffirming that evidence is not to be “weighed” on a summary
judgment motion and must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party). In a recently published book, SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A.
THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION
LAW (2017), the authors persuasively argue that the hyperactivity in granting
summary judgment motions in civil rights, age discrimination, and disability
cases—all matters governed by protective federal statutes—usurps the role of the
jury on such questions as what constitutes discrimination by effectively engaging
in fact-finding and deciding how the facts should be applied. An extreme position
on this subject is taken in Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 148–58 (2007) (contrasting the summary
judgment motion with English common law procedural devices).
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question of what really motivates the widespread invocation of the
motion.88 When today’s summary judgment practice is combined with the
other procedural impediments I have catalogued and others I might have
added to my list,89 I am led to ask: what has happened to that relatively
uncluttered Gold Standard of my youth?90
88. Obviously, the interposition of a summary judgment motion postpones (and
possibly eliminates) any trial and probably lowers the settlement value of the case. A
distinguished federal judge takes a dim view of the frequency with which the motion
is made, the resources expended, and the marginal results achieved. Victor Marrero,
The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1663–70 (2016).
89. For example, a number of years ago the Supreme Court imposed
constitutional limitations on punitive damages, previously thought to be a matter of
state law. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503–15 (2008)
(limiting punitive damages in admiralty); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423, 425–26 (2003) (limiting punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996)
(same); TXO Prods. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993) (same).
In effect, these cases federalized the question of how to define the upper limit of a
punitive damage award. The decisions by the Court preempting state law on that
subject have been criticized. See generally Martin H. Redish & Andrew L.
Mathews, Why Punitive Damages are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 10 (2004)
(discussing the potential harms caused by unchecked jury awards of punitive
damages and judicial responses to such harms). Additional stop signs take the form
of judicial receptivity to motions to dismiss based on standing, preemption,
immunity, abstention, exhaustion, time limitations, and other threshold matters.
90. I have written extensively—some might say excessively—on these matters.
See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77; Miller, McIntyre in
Context, supra note 24; Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors
Closing? What’s Happened to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 587 (2011); Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules, supra note
34; Miller, Pretrial Rush to Judgment, supra note 82. A number of prominent
proceduralists have as well. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right
of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims Against Businesses, 46 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 537 (2013) (discussing the “subversion” of Rule 23(b)(3)); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
The effect of these procedural developments in two important public policy arenas
is canvassed in Suzette Marie Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: TransSubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on
Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455 (2014); Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed:
Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307 (2010). Other commentators argue that the Supreme
Court’s decisions “interpreting” (some would say “amending”) the Federal Rules
and on other procedural matters have been designed to curtail the private
enforcement of statutory rights and other public policies. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank
& Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
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II. THE PRIVATIZATION OF CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The easy-access philosophy underlying the original Federal Rules
welcoming citizens to the courthouse also is being displaced by significant
pressures that are diverting disputes from the public court system to
mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution.91
Many businesses and employers now insist on private dispute resolution
with their customers and employees through the widespread use of
contractual mandatory arbitration provisions that expressly forbid resort to
the courts; many of these provisions also prohibit the use of any form of
aggregate arbitration. These clauses impact important areas of substantive
law and affect a range of consumer, financing, employment, and small
business transactions. These activities are engaged in by millions of
people. Thus, dispute resolution is being privatized by a process that is
invisible, under the control of industry, not constrained by rules of
evidence or procedure, and lacks any meaningful judicial or other review.
The expansive use of contractually mandated arbitration undermines
the availability of the class action and other aggregation methods. It is
fueled by the Supreme Court’s seemingly boundless application of the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).92 Of particular concern is the Court’s
1543 (2014) [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform]; Judith Resnik,
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
HARV. L. REV. 924, 928–30 (2000); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the
Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2006); A. Benjamin Spencer, The
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010);
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts
Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 314–32 (2012).
91. See the comprehensive discussion of this subject in Judith Resnik, The
Privatization of Process: Celebration and Requiem for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802–06 (2015).
92. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)). Some statutes void arbitration clauses in certain
limited contexts. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (except for residential
mortgages and car loans, arbitration clauses in payday loans and consumer credit
contracts with members of the military and their family members are void); 15
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in automobile
franchise agreements). On the other hand, some federal statutes provide for the
arbitration of disputes. E.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
of 1947, Pub. L. No. 114-38 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y);
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-606, § 205(c)(1), 92 Stat. 3045
(codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 220529) (any party aggrieved by a
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validation of these clauses—including their class action and aggregate
arbitration waivers—in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion93 and
American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant.94 To me it was strikingly
inappropriate to do so in these cases. Concepcion involves a consumer’s
claim that the defendant had advertised a “free” phone but then improperly
charged him $30 for sales tax. Italian Colors is a federal antitrust action
pursued by small businesses that asserted claims that were not
economically substantial enough to be brought as individual actions or
arbitrations.
Concepcion authorizes the preemption of state contract law doctrines,
such as unconscionability (the Arbitration Act might have been interpreted to
preserve them),95 and, like CAFA, is another example of the federalization of
state law claims.96 Italian Colors enables the circumvention of federal
substantive statutes, such as the antitrust and securities laws, because the

determination may seek review by any regional office of the American Arbitration
Association); Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-364, § 4221(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1208 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1401)
(any dispute between an employer and the sponsor of a multiemployer plan
concerning a pension determination); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1847
(2010) (SEC rule on investor agreements).
93. AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also
DirectTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
94. Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) reaffirmed its bar on enforcing predispute class action waivers after the Supreme Court decisions. Charles Schwab
& Co., 2014 WL 1665738, at *18 (FINRA April 24, 2014).
95. 9 U.S.C. § 2. In Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct.
1421, 1426 (2017), the Court reaffirmed its preemption of any state contract rule
that reflects “discrimination on its face against arbitration” and “displaces any rule
that covertly accomplishes the same objective.” The Court struck down
Kentucky’s requirement of a “clear statement” waiving “the right to go to court
and receive a jury trial” because it was “tailor-made to [apply to] arbitration
agreements” and singled them out “for disfavored treatment.” Id. at 1423; see also
Allied Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding that state
laws singling out arbitration clauses are subject to the FAA). So much for
Kentucky’s attempt to protect the exercise of two constitutional rights.
96. See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333 (consumer claim); Marmet Health
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (state claim against a nursing
home); Circuit Cities Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 106 (2001) (state sex
discrimination claim); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991) (age discrimination); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
(California’s Franchise Investment Law).
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Court simply has declared that the Arbitration Act trumps them.97 In effect,
the Court has created a powerful federal common law of arbitration.98 Thus,
a supposed, but largely judicially fabricated, national commitment to
arbitration has enabled a dramatic impairment of access to the courts. The
decisions also deprive people of the opportunity to participate in a class
action or aggregate arbitration of related and sometimes identical matters,
which often is an economic necessity since the individual claims typically
have a negative value from a dispute resolution perspective.99

97. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 228 (antitrust claims); CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (Credit Repair Organization Act);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities
claim); Shearson Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (stating that an antitrust claim
will be “effectively vindicated” in an arbitral forum); Jones v. Waffle House, Inc.,
866 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (Fair Credit Reporting Act).
98. See Michael J. Yelonsky, Fully-Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act,
90 OR. L. REV. 729 (2012).
99. The extraordinary expansion of the FAA’s application by the Supreme Court
and the statute’s legislative history are discussed in Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration
Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1426–32 (2008); Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration
Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265 (2015); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006); Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, The Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2860–71 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes]; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1635–42 (2005); see also Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died:
Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 317 [hereinafter Gilles,
The Day Doctrine Died]. The diversion of disputes to arbitration and other forms of
alternative dispute resolution also have been thought desirable to help ameliorate the
growing caseloads in the federal courts and to husband their limited resources. See,
e.g., Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981)
(stating that the purpose of the FAA is “to relieve congestion in the courts and to
provide parties with an alternative method of dispute resolution”), abrogated on other
grounds by Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Congress also has promoted this movement. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 621–658). As
a distinguished scholar of the subject has pointed out, the “Supreme Court has not
produced a single decision finding arbitration inadequate, inaccessible, or ineffective
to vindicate rights.” Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra, at 2886. I submit, as she and
the dissenting Justices have, that American Express fits that description perfectly. I
sense (perhaps it is unjustified optimism) that some courts are not eager to extend the
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In the consumer and financing fields, as well as in many employment
and small business contexts, these no-class-or-aggregate-arbitration
clauses are completely adhesive.100 They are not the product of arm’s
length bargaining—or any bargaining—in most cases. Invocation of the
“freedom of contract” cliché to justify them defies reality. Nonetheless,
people are being subjected to these clauses in contracts about a wide range
of basic consumer transactions involving both societal amenities and
necessities as well as being denied the protection of federal statutes and
state law.101 Some academics depressingly express concerns that
permitting the enforcement of these clauses is the “coup de grace”—the
end of any effective aggregate procedure for handling a wide variety of
claims that have been subjected to mandatory arbitration provisions.102
The Supreme Court’s decisions are based on a statute enacted almost
a century ago for resolving inter-corporate disputes between sophisticated
entities, not consumer, employment, or small business claims. It is
Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions. For example, in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393
P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017), the California Supreme Court declined to enforce an arbitration
clause in a credit card agreement waiving the right to seek public injunctive relief in
any forum. The court concluded that a California statute providing that “a law
established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement,” CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3513 (West 2017), is a generally applicable contract defense, does not
discriminate against arbitration, and therefore is not preempted by the FAA. Id. at 94–
98. But cf. the cases cited supra note 95.
100. Various aspects of the utilization of these clauses are discussed in the
following articles. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 871 (2008); Gilles,
The Day Doctrine Died, supra note 99; Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99;
Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American
Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015).
101. The Court was once far more protective of consumers and employees
regarding arbitration clauses. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953);
cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002). The same is true of people
who lacked “bargaining power,” see, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally J. Maria
Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052 (2015); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99, at 2836–39.
102. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation
in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627, 658–
60 (2012) (“Class actions are on the ropes.”); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra
note 99 (arguing that the diffusion of disputes to private, unaccountable, and
unknowable adjudicators is unconstitutional).
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apparent that the Court’s striking attraction for arbitration reflects its sense
of the limited resources of the federal judiciary and perhaps a lack of
confidence in state and federal trial courts, as well as a mistrust of juries;
it also may be a byproduct of the anti-litigation campaign that has been
waged for several decades in the courts and the public arena by the defense
bar and business interests.103
Moreover, despite Justice Scalia’s assertion in his Concepcion and
Italian Colors opinions that group arbitration does not work and is
inconsistent with the supposed economies and efficiencies of arbitration,104
there is considerable experience with aggregate and class arbitration that
does not reveal any intractable difficulties.105 And what of the other values
that are at stake? Little or no attention has been paid to the possibly
deleterious effect of those clauses on traditional due-process notions based
on the day-in-court principle, the jury trial guarantee, federalism,
transparency of process, substantive law development, and the need for
oversight of arbitration practices, let alone to the potential negative effect
on the enforcement of important public policies that result from diverting
dispute resolution away from the public court system.106

103. See discussion infra notes 173–182.
104. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 228; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333;
see also Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012); Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
105. At the time Concepcion was decided, the rules of the American Arbitration
Association provided for class arbitration. AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files
/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GGS4-AX5A]. See generally David Horton, Mass Arbitrations and Democratic
Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2014). The Court’s negative view of group
adjudication in favor of arbitration stands in contrast with the apparent growth in
the use of class actions and other aggregation techniques in the courts. See generally
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action,
126 YALE L.J. 1634, 1643 (2017) (“As a practical matter . . . [these procedures]
offer agencies important new tools to respond to rising case volumes while
promoting legal access.”).
106. The many critical commentaries on the two Supreme Court decisions
include Carrington, supra note 90; Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died, supra note 99;
Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 204 n.136
(2015) (arguing mandatory arbitration violates freedom of association). See
generally Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 99, passim (the Supreme Court’s
arbitration decisions have created an unconstitutional system); see also Lauren Guth
Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers
Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 329 (2015); Sara E. Costello, Class Action Waivers Hang in the
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It seems obvious that most people are not even aware that they are
limited to one-by-one arbitration should they have the fortitude and want
to pursue a claim against their contracting partner.107 The available
evidence shows that arbitration is rarely invoked on an individual basis.108
Almost no consumer, employee, or small business has the ability, training,
or resources to navigate the arbitration process effectively.109 It simply is
not a meaningful substitute for the possibility of going to a court of limited
monetary jurisdiction or vicariously participating in a class action or
aggregate arbitration proceeding.110 In the few instances in which
individual arbitration is pursued, the claimant typically is opposed by a
substantial company represented by a lawyer experienced by prior
participation in similar proceedings and an arbitrator who may well have
Balance, 42 LITIG. NEWS, Winter 2017, at 10 (2017); Jack Downing, Note, An
Important Time for the Future of Class Action Waivers and the Power Struggle
Between Business and Consumers, 81 MO. L. REV. 1151 (2016). But cf. Michael
Hoenig & Linda M. Brown, Arbitration and Class Action Waivers Under
Concepcion: Reason and Reasonableness Deflect Strident Attacks, 68 ARK. L. REV.
669, 670 (2015) (“There are several cogent reasons for the continued vitality of class
action waivers.”).
107. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTIONS ACT § 1.4.2, at 11 (Mar. 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201
503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [hereinafter ARBITRATION
STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS] (finding that consumers are generally unaware of
whether their credit card contracts include arbitration clauses) [https://perma.cc/QTM433JD].
108. Id. § 7.3, at 8 (describing the infrequency of individual consumer-initiated
arbitration claims in the credit market); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 1 (2011).
109. The assertions in the Supreme Court’s majority opinions in these cases
that arbitration is more effective, cheaper, faster, and less burdensome than
litigation are subject to doubt given the absence of empiric proof to that effect and
the lack of the metrics needed to make the comparison. See Andrea Cann
Chandrasekher & David Horton, After the Revolution: An Empirical Study of
Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015); Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 99, at 2812–14 (“[T]he number of documented consumer arbitrations
is startlingly small.”). Some commentators, however, argue that arbitration is
preferable to the class action. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin,
Consumer Financial Services Arbitration: What Does the Future Hold After
Concepcion?, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 345 (2013).
110. This was the conclusion of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in
its arbitration report. See ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
107, § 1.4.3, at 11.

2018]

WHAT ARE COURTS FOR?

779

an economic interest to favor repeat players.111 Moreover, lawyers
frequently are unwilling to undertake arbitration claims, especially on an
individual basis. In short, the picture is so discouraging that people
overwhelmingly decide not to pursue their claims despite their potential
merits.
Two things should be mentioned that somewhat ameliorate the effects
of Concepcion and Italian Colors. First, in certain contexts a very
significant percentage of mandatory, no-aggregation arbitration clauses
have a carve-out that allows the consumer to go to a small claims court.112
They generally are thought to be consumer friendly. Many of those courts,
however, do not have class action or aggregate procedures, and some are
not empowered to grant equitable relief to stop a practice found offensive.
Second, both the American Arbitration Association and the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service (“JAMS”), the two most significant
providers of arbitrator services, have protocols assuring a modicum of
procedural regularity.113
Although there initially was some movement in Congress to overturn
the Supreme Court’s decisions by legislation,114 that movement has
become extremely unlikely given the outcome of the 2016 presidential and
congressional elections. Similarly, the young Federal Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),115 which was created as a watchdog agency

111. Sometimes, the deck appears stacked against the claimant. See Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Beware of the Fine Print Part II, in
Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatizationof-the-justice-system.html?_r=0 (part of a three-part series critical of arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts) [https://perma.cc/E5A7-2Q8P].
112. See ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 107, § 1.4.1, at 10.
113. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1980);
JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2009), https://www.jamsadr.com
/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X78F-YC4Z].
114. E.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 2929 (2011);
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Cong. § 22 (2011). Neither
bill got out of committee. The current bill is the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017,
S. 537, 115th Cong. § 402 (2017) (invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in the employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights contexts).
115. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518
(2012). The Bureau issued a report based on an extensive study that is extremely
critical of various arbitration clause abuses. ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 107, § 1128(a). See generally Nicholas M. Engel, Comment,
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following the mortgage crisis during the last decade and seemed so
promising to consumer advocates a short time ago, has not been able to
secure the effectiveness of its recent arbitration rule that would have
effectively eliminated the application of Concepcion and Italian Colors in
an array of important consumer contexts. 116 Immediately after the rule was
promulgated by the CFPB, the business community led by the Chamber of
Commerce attacked it in Congress, which has the statutory power to reject
administrative agency rulemaking.117 First the House of Representatives
voted against the rule along partisan lines without any meaningful
deliberation.118 Then, after months of intense lobbying and a war of words
involving a large number of interested parties, the Senate also rejected it.119
Thus, the arbitration rule will not go into effect.120 This represents a major
On Waiving Class Action Waivers: A Critique and Defense of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s Proposed Regulations, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 231 (2016).
116. 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017). The rule was issued on July 10, 2017 and would
have gone into effect in 2018. The Chamber of Commerce and some members of
Congress immediately called for the rule to be rejected by Congress. See Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Rule Could Let Consumers Sue Financial
Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2017, p. 1, col. 6, https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-banks.html [https://perma
.cc/SL25-6FRH].
117. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808.
118. See, e.g., Michael Macagnone, House to Vote to Overturn CFPB Arbitration
Rule, LAW360 (July 24, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/947461/house-tovote-to-overturn-cfpb-arbitration-rule [https://perma.cc/6UWU-BSNW]; Yuka
Hayashi, House Votes to Repeal CFPB’s Arbitration Rule, WALL ST. J. (July 25,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-repeal-cfpbs-arbitration-rule-15
01017889?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/U3SM-82CZ].
119. With two exceptions, the Senators voted along party lines and divided 50
to 50. That tie enabled Vice President Pence to cast the deciding vote to reject the
CFPB’s rule. It is impossible to know what avenues consumer interests may pursue
regarding arbitration clauses in the future. In addition to the challenge in Congress,
major business groups brought lawsuits in federal court attacking the
constitutionality of the rule. See PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Case No. 3:17-cv-02670 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
A day after President Trump officially nullified the CFPB’s work product, these
actions were voluntarily dismissed.
120. Had the rule gone into effect it arguably would have represented a
“congressional command” that would have overridden the judicial construction
of the Arbitration Act, thereby limiting the application of Concepcion and Italian
Colors in important consumer contexts. See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest.,
570 U.S. 228, 233–34 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95,
98, 101–02 (2012); see also the cases cited infra note 125.
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defeat for the CFPB and a corresponding victory for the business
community. Beyond the loss of the arbitration rule fight, the very
existence, or at least the leadership and direction of the Bureau,
undoubtedly will change.121 Such is the tenor of the times in the United
States.
There are possibilities for limiting the application of some aspects of
the arbitration decisions, however. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari122 and heard argument in a consolidated trio of cases that may
determine whether Concepcion and Italian Colors apply to employment
contracts or whether bans on aggregate litigation and group arbitration in
that context are unenforceable because they are inconsistent with the
policies and procedures of the National Labor Relations Act.123 Other
121. Plans have been underway for some time to circumscribe the CFPB’s
scope of operation, The Editorial Board, Hands Off the Consumer Finance
Bureau, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 10, 2017, p. A14, col. 1. Richard Cordray, the
consumer-oriented director of the Bureau, was appointed by President Obama.
He resigned shortly after Congress rejected the arbitration rule, months before the
expiration of his five year Term. President Trump has appointed a much more
business-friendly successor. See Stacey Cowley & Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Richard Cordray’s Exit From Consumer Bureau Gives Trump an Opening, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/business/cordrayconsumer-protection.html [https://perma.cc/LW8J-N8P3]. See generally Ronald
L. Rubin, Cordray’s Choice, To Save the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
its Director Must Resign, NAT’L REV. (March 17, 2017), http://www.nationalreview
.com/article/445758/richard-cordray-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-direct
or-must-resign (arguing that the CFPB’s Director’s partisanship encourages the
Republican Party to dismantle the CFPB, and perhaps the way to save it is to change
leadership) [https://perma.cc/Y5WF-HKFX].
122. Ernst & Young v. Morris, 137 S. Ct. 909 (2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct.
809 (2017). The courts of appeal are divided on this issue. Compare Morris v. Ernst
& Young, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (determining that a concerted action waiver
violates the NLRA), and Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (determining that an agreement barring
collective arbitration violates the NLRA), with In re LogistiCare Solutions, Inc. v.
NLRB, 866 F.3d 715 (5th Cir. 2017); Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d
1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (enforcing an arbitration
clause); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing the
NLRB’s decision invalidating a class action waiver); and Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (enforcing a class action waiver). See Costello,
supra note 106 (discussing the federal circuit court split on the validity of class
action waiver provisions and the implications of that division).
123. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 82-189, 65 Stat. 601 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)). Courts occasionally have declined to enforce
arbitration clauses when the process suffered from structural or procedural
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efforts by certain federal agencies, such as the regulation of the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) regarding nursing
homes (which is also under attack),124 to limit mandatory no-class
arbitration clauses in contracts within their jurisdiction or to use their
administrative enforcement powers to secure victim-specific relief when
there is a statutory basis for doing so125 may prove more successful—
again, if they survive. Unfortunately, at best these provisions only provide
a piecemeal and limited amelioration of the effect of the two Supreme
Court decisions.
There also is the possibility that state attorneys general, using their
parens patriae power, or private individuals acting on behalf of the state,
might bring suit under the rubric of protecting the community’s health,

infirmities. See, e.g., Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Mkts, Inc., 840 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir.
2016) (finding the arbitrator misrepresented that he was a licensed attorney);
Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding a failure to
provide “an impartial decision maker”). Judicial scrutiny of such matters may not
be as intense as it once was, however.
124. 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(n)(1)(2), at 524 (2016) (barring the entry into predispute arbitration agreements or requesting that a patient sign one as a condition
of admission to a facility). The regulation has been challenged in courts in a
number of states by nursing home groups, some of which have succeeded in
securing an injunction against it taking effect. The Center for Medicare Services
and the Justice Department were working on appeals at the end of President
Obama’s administration, but the current Department apparently has abandoned
that effort, leaving an injunction in force. In a parallel case, Am. Health Care
Ass’n v. Burwell, 217 F. Supp. 3d 921 (N.D. Miss. 2017), against the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
to declare the rule barring entering into pre-dispute arbitration agreements
unlawful, the district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the rule’s
enforcement. An appeal was dismissed by Thomas Price, who was then President
Trump’s appointee as Secretary of HHS. See generally Robert Pear, Trump Moves
to Impede Consumer Lawsuits Against Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/us/politics/trump-impedes-consumer-lawsuits
-against-nursing-homes-deregulation.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5SNE-XY93].
125. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279
(2002) (determining that an arbitration clause does not prevent the EEOC from
seeking back pay, reinstatement, and damages in an ADA enforcement action).
Courts also have recognized that waivers are unenforceable when there is a
“contrary congressional command.” See Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair,
L.L.C., 745 F.3d 1326, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that no such
“command” can be found in the Fair Labor Standards Act); see also Smallwood v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding foreign arbitration
clauses are precluded by the Carmack Amendment).

2018]

WHAT ARE COURTS FOR?

783

welfare, and safety.126 Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this
approach is the group of parallel actions by various state attorneys general
against the tobacco industry seeking reimbursement for the states’
increased medical expenses resulting from treating ailments caused by
smoking.127 That collective approach led to a settlement with all the states
of over $200 billion.128
Neither the state nor a third party acting for the state is bound by an
arbitration clause because they are not parties to the contract.129 And

126. The state must have its own interest in the litigation that is independent
from the claims of the individual citizens. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v.
Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Georgia ex rel. Hart v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230 (1907). For example, the California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004
empowers an employee to bring an action on behalf of current or former
employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. CAL. LABOR CODE
§§ 2698–2699.5 (West 2017). The California Supreme Court has ruled that an
action under the statute is not a class action. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A.,
L.L.C., 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014).
127. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997)
(concluding that the state had authority to bring a common-law parens patriae
action without statutory authority). See generally Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore
Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859 (2000).
128. Ten states have settled their suits against Volkswagen for environmental
damage caused by the company’s cheating on the emission control rules
established by the states. The settlement amount is reported to be $157 million.
See Bill Vlasic, Volkswagen to Pay 10 States Over Environmental Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, March 30, 2017, at p. B3, col. 1.
129. Parens Patriae actions have been used in a variety of contexts, including
consumer claims and mass torts. E.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Sons v. Puerto Rico,
458 U.S. 592 (1982) (determining that Puerto Rico could proceed in parens
patriae to protect its economic interests from violations of federal law); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (allowing the state to sue for
antitrust violations in its proprietary capacity and on the basis of parens patriae
on behalf of its citizens); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1901) (allowing suit
based on a nuisance theory). See generally Edward Brunet, Improving Class
Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1919 (2000); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 102, at 658–75 (arguing
that state attorneys general should take leadership positions using private lawyers
when needed); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public:
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012)
(discussing provisions empowering actions to recover money on behalf of
citizens); Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police
Power, 69 SMU L. REV. 759 (2016) (concluding that parens patriae litigation has
its roots in the states’ police power).
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because a parens patriae action is not a class action, the state has the
additional advantages of not being subject to the often cumbersome
prerequisites and procedures of Rule 23 and CAFA’s federalization of
most class and mass actions.130 But the parens patriae possibility depends
on whether a particular state has given its attorney general or private
individuals acting on behalf of the state standing to bring such an action,
whether the political climate in that state favors or discourages parens
patriae actions and whether the attorney general has sufficient internal
resources or is willing to retain experienced private attorneys to prosecute
the action, as was done in the tobacco litigation. Parens patriae actions,
however, often present other procedural difficulties and concerns.131
Moreover, any defense interests that might be negatively affected by such
an action most certainly would lobby against its institution.
There is yet another departure from the courts worth noting. Following
certain calamities, special private and governmentally sanctioned dispute
resolution mechanisms have been established that in some respects are
thought more efficient, cheaper, and less formal than the judicial process
130. See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014).
This case is extensively analyzed in Vairo, supra note 63, at 520–26. Also, these
actions probably would not be affected by the possible enactment of the Fairness
in Class Action Litigation Act described in note 66, supra.
131. Because it is not a class action, a parens patriae action would not be
governed by the protective provisions prescribed by Rule 23, particularly those
applicable to Rule 23(b)(3) actions, most notably a court determination of adequacy
of representation, notice to all those potentially affected by the action, and the right
to opt out. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World,
L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2016). The absence of these and other procedural
protections raises concerns about such matters as the quality of the attorney
general’s representation of the often divergent interests of the various people and
entities in the state, the possibility of political or ideological conflicts of interest, the
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of any settlement agreed to by the attorney
general or her chosen surrogate, the propriety of any attorney’s fee arrangement or
award if private counsel is employed, and whether every citizen or resident of the
state is bound by the judgment or is free to bring an individual (or perhaps a class)
action after the attorney general’s action is resolved. See Lemos, supra note 129
(discussing these and other concerns about parens patriae actions). Problems also
might arise when one or more private actions are proceeding at the same time as one
or more parens patriae actions. See, e.g., California v. IntelliGender, L.L.C., 771
F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining parens patriae proceeding banned by a prior
settlement of class actions brought on behalf of California consumers). Perhaps
parens patriae actions should be judicially treated as quasi-class actions. See
discussion infra notes 155–162. At a minimum, the importance of judicial and
citizen oversight of the proceeding and its aftermath should be recognized and
assured by the court.
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for compensating victims. Two exemplars of this approach are the
statutory arrangement for claims arising out of the 9/11 terrorist attack on
the Twin Towers in New York City132 and the fund established by British
Petroleum following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico.133 Public and private arrangements like these replace the public
court system and do not have most of the indicia of traditional civil
litigation. The merits of these ad hoc mechanisms may be considerable,
but they offer little to no transparency or assurance that all claimants will
be treated equally and do not employ procedural and evidentiary rules or
appellate judicial review comparable to those available in the public
courts. But these concerns may just be academic quibbles.
Specialist Kenneth R. Feinberg’s “rough justice” approach for the
private resolution of related claims stands out.134 Of course, thus far there
is only one Ken Feinberg who has a special genius and boundless energy
for handling matters of this type.135 Realistically, these arrangements are
132. Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)). See generally LLOYD DIXON &
RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION
FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS (2004), http://www.rand.org
/publications/MG/MG264/ [https://perma.cc/M7WB-4VQB]; Peter Schuck,
Special Dispensation, AM. LAW., June 1, 2004, at 69–71; Anthony J. Sebok, What's
Law Got to Do With It? Designing Compensation Schemes in the Shadow of the
Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501, 517 (2003).
133. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 401 (2014). See generally John S. Backer, Jr., The BP Gulf Oil Spill Class
Settlement: Redistributive “Justice”?, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 287 (2015)
(questioning the settlement); Catherine M. Sharkey, The BP Oil Spill Settlement,
Classwide Punitive Damages, and Societal Deterrence, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 681
(2015) (discussing criticisms of the settlement).
134. In addition to 9/11 and BP, Ken has been appointed to administer such
matters as the Boston Marathon bombing, the Penn State sex-abuse scandal, and the
shootings in the Orlando, Florida Pulse nightclub. In Samuel Issacharoff & D.
Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation,
74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014), the authors demonstrate that despite the lower
transaction costs, speed, and informality achieved by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
established by BP, the payments made pursuant to the settlement of the class action
that replaced it were measurably higher. The authors theorize that for various
reasons BP secured a greater degree of finality from the class action and was willing
to pay a “peace premium” for a global resolution. They conclude that both sides did
better in the public system. Id. at 412; see also D. Theodore Rave, Governing the
Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1192–98 (2013).
135. Another gifted practitioner of this art is Professor Francis E. McGovern of
Duke Law School, who has served as a special master in several high-profile
disputes, including asbestos and hazardous waste cleanup cases, and various mass
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one-off departures from the public court system that will be created only
in a limited number of special circumstances. They are motivated by an
understandable desire for consistency in result, expeditious handling of
claims arising from particular events that cry out for special treatment,
procedural informality, and claimant privacy. These are things dispersed
individual lawsuits cannot guarantee. Although these private arrangements
are infrequent and have a contained scope, they represent another
manifestation of the “outsourcing” of the resolution of civil claims that
normally would fall within the ambit of the public courts and at some level
reflect a lack of confidence in the judicial process.136
III. RELATED RELEVANT PROCEDURAL PHENOMENA
To appraise the current state of civil litigation in the United States,
particularly in the federal courts, it is important to consider other
procedural phenomena that neither Judge Rubin nor I could have foreseen
when we were young professionals, but today are major aspects of the civil
litigation panorama. What follows focuses on two of them—multidistrict
litigation and case management. Both are integrally related to the procedural
developments discussed earlier.
A. Multidistrict Litigation
The first of these had its genesis in 1968 when Congress created the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,137 a special tribunal of seven
federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice empowered to transfer all
cases in the federal courts “involving one or more common questions of
tort matters, such as the Station nightclub fire in West Warwick, Rhode Island. See
Faculty Profile, Professor Francis E. McGovern, DUKE, https://law.duke.edu
/fac/mcgovern/ [https://perma.cc/SYH7-F84W].
136. The ongoing quest for ways of resolving mass claims without endless
litigation in the courts includes resort to aggregation through bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 524(g). See generally Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of
Aggregate Litigation: The Past as Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839 (2013).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The background that led to the enactment of the statute
is set forth in Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964). See generally 15
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & RICHARD
D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED
MATTERS §§ 3861–3868 (4th ed. 2013); Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”:
The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017); Jaime
Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass Multidistrict
Litigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329 (2014).
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fact” to a single district judge “for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings.” The statute was an early response to the emerging problem
of handling what was then called “The Big Case.”
The consolidation of dispersed but related cases for group pretrial
processing under the governance of a single judge has become an increasingly
ubiquitous feature of federal litigation and now has counterparts in a number
of states.138 It is a reflection of the quest for efficiency, economy, and
consistent treatment of related claims. Multi-district-litigation (“MDL”)
practice under the statute, which has now been with us for 50 years, has
become transformative. Indeed, it is fair to say it has become a megaphenomenon. Excluding pro se cases, it is estimated that close to 40% of
the civil cases in the federal courts are part of an MDL.139 That statistic is
truly stunning. Because class certification has become so difficult to secure
and the process of seeking it freighted with so many burdens,140 there has
been a pronounced shift by many lawyers to the MDL alternative for
aggregating claims. As a result, the class action has been partially absorbed
and replaced by MDL practice; it is not unusual for one or more class
actions to be embedded in an MDL.
The transferee judge has enormous control over the consolidated cases
even though the statute requires, as the Supreme Court has held,141 that the
138. Among the state provisions most analogous to the federal statute are CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404–404.9 (West 2017) (authorizing coordination of cases
sharing a common question of fact or law if it will promote the ends of justice);
see 22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 202.69–202.70(a)-(b)
(enumerating the jurisdiction of the Commercial Division of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York over 12 types of business actions); TEX. GOVT. Code
ANN. § 74.161 (West 2017); TEX. RULES JUD. ADMIN. r. 13 (coordination of cases
having one or more common questions).
139. See DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST
PRACTICES x n.2 (2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicial
studies/MDL_Standards_and_Best_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf (“In 2014,
these MDL cases make up 36% of the civil case load.”) [https://perma.cc/PK9LBTBG]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70
VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies] (noting that from
2002 to 2015 MDL proceedings “leapt from sixteen to thirty-nine percent” of the
civil caseload). There was a decline in grants of consolidation petitions by the
Panel in 2016. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR
STATISTICS JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2016, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov
/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2016.pdf (2017) [https://perma
.cc/BG4Y-YEZK].
140. See discussion supra Part II.C.
141. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26
(1998) (concluding that the text of the MDL statute requires retransfer to the
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individual litigation units must be returned to the Panel and then sent to
the courts in which they originated when pretrial proceedings have been
concluded. As a practical matter, however, the overwhelming majority of
transferred cases are resolved by settlement, a pretrial dispositive motion
before retransfer, or remain in place by consent, further empowering the
transferee judge and the lawyers who control the MDL.142 “Work outs” are
typically achieved, sometimes following carefully selected bellwether
trials, such as in the In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation
(pharmaceutical)143 and In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip
Implant Products Liability Litigation (implant)144 matters. In the In re
Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products
Liability Litigation (emissions),145 two significant settlements were

Panel). Legislative attempts to overrule Lexecon to empower the transferee judge
to retain and adjudicate the cases have failed. See, e.g., Multidistrict Litigation
Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1038, 109th Cong. (2005); Multidistrict,
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001, H.R. 860, 107th Cong.
(2001) (the portion of the bill concerning Lexecon died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but the section dealing with mass disasters is now codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1369). See generally Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of
Dispersed Litigation? Toward A Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation
Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008) [hereinafter Marcus, CureAll for an Era of Dispersed Litigation].
142. One prominent commentator on MDL litigation estimates “that just 2.9%
of cases return to their original districts.” See Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139,
at 72. Resolution in the transferee court by a judge who has become steeped in the
dispute and its management may well be preferable to dispersing the consolidated
individual units to numerous judges who are not familiar with the case or cases
being transferred to him or her, which would subject them to variances in court
dockets, delays, rules of procedure, and appellate review. All of these factors are
likely to postpone the dispute’s overall resolution and produce significant
differences in management and result. On the other hand, collective resolution in
the transferee court may be at the expense of the individual autonomy, accuracy,
and attention to the variousness of state laws and the circumstances of individual
litigants. See discussion infra notes 151–162 and accompanying text.
143. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007).
144. In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Products Liab.
Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011). The first bellwether trial resulted in
a defense verdict; in the second, a jury awarded compensatory and punitive
damages totaling approximately $500 million; the third led to a plaintiffs’ verdict
of $502 million; the second and third verdicts are now in the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. A fourth bellwether trial is now in progress.
145. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, and Prods. Liab.
Litig., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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efficiently accomplished without any trial through the collaboration of the
company, the plaintiffs’ steering committee, and the transferee judge.146
State court actions are not covered by the federal statute, but the global
settlement of an MDL proceeding often embraces the parallel state cases,
even those that could not have been initiated in a federal court for
jurisdictional reasons.147 Indeed, because defendants typically want to
secure maximum preclusion and closure from a settlement, they often are
willing to pay a “peace premium” if the settlement truly is global and
embraces cases in both the federal and state courts.148
MDL consolidation often affords individual plaintiffs and class
members a forum for asserting claims that otherwise might have near-zero
or negative litigation value, would languish indefinitely in various courts
around the country, or yield inconsistent results if each claim had to be
brought individually in separate federal and state courts. Furthermore,
given today’s judicial attitudes, most mass and toxic tort matters probably
could not be certified as class actions, especially when the class members’
rights are governed by the laws of multiple states.149 Those are all positive
attributes of an MDL. But the implicit—and clear—culture of MDL
transferee judges and lead counsel on both sides appears to have become
the facilitation of settlement—as noted, preferably a global one embracing
state cases.150 Indeed, settlement has become a dominant motif of MDL
146. No trials were held, presumably because liability was conceded. The
settlement terms are quite favorable for the class members, in part because the
company wants to put the unfortunate affair behind it. In contrast to the progress
in this country, proceedings in Germany where Volkswagen clearly is “at home”
are barely underway. Germany does not have a class action procedure comparable
to Federal Rule 23.
147. See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to
Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN.
L. REV. 775, 793–98 (2010) (discussing a shift from using class action procedures to
multidistrict-litigation procedures to manage and resolve tort litigation).
148. See generally Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 134; see also Rave, supra
note 134, at 1192–98.
149. See supra note 58. Judge Rubin recognized at an early date that mass torts were
a national—not a local—problem and called for a federal statute governing product and
disaster litigation as well as proportionate liability when causation is unclear. Alvin B.
Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429 (1986).
150. See generally RICHARD NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF
SETTLEMENT (2007); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent
Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
“Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (“Oft-cited figures estimating settlement rates of
between 85 and 95 percent are misleading; those figures represent all civil cases that
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practice. This is an understandable aspect of today’s focus on litigation
efficiency and economy and a manifestation of how lawyers and judges
often seem to avoid merit determinations.
I am not a troglodyte. I understand that “going to the merits” often is
costly and risky. Like most observers I believe settlement usually is
desirable, perhaps even to be prayed for. But I doubt it always should be
an institutional driver. Remember, even assuming that the MDL process is
efficient, reduces inconsistencies in result and treatment, achieves
litigation peace, and federal judges apparently enjoy and take professional
pride in managing and resolving these behemoths, consolidation does
compromise the traditional right of individual plaintiffs to determine when
to sue, choose a forum, be represented by a lawyer of his or her choice,
and control or meaningfully participate in the process.151
do not go to trial.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008
SUP. CT. REV. 183 (2008); Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public
Value of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177 (2009); Samuel Issacharoff & John
Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004); David Marcus, Some Realism
About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949 (2008); Marcus, Cure-All for Dispersed
Litigation, supra note 141, at 2288–89 (noting the settlement orientation); Francis
E. McGovern, A Model State Mass Tort Settlement Statute, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1809
(2006); Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2010); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for
Resolving Complex Litigation of a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2205 (2008); Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and
Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 301 (2004); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems
and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
151. It has been argued that the understandable preoccupation with the
efficiency of aggregation and achieving finality has obscured its negative effects
on other systemic values. E.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013). Also, because multidistrict litigation involving
hundreds or thousands of cases often is in the hands of repeat players, principalagent concerns have been raised about whether the interests of individual clients
are being subordinated to the interests of those controlling the litigation. E.g.,
Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139 (offering suggestions for restoring
competition); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players
in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445
(2017); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All:
Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 117–18, 128 (2015); Margaret S. Williams &
Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to
Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
424, 424 (2013); see also Abbie R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern
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Consider the saga of someone with a small but reasonably meritorious
grievance—perhaps one under a protective federal or state consumer or
products statute—who consults a lawyer in Baton Rouge. Let us assume
she is an accomplished practitioner but cannot take the case for economic
reasons, a conflict of interest, some other commitment, or a lack of
experience in the relevant substantive field. But to help someone who
perhaps is a relative, neighbor, past client, or to pursue the public interest,
she passes the matter along to an “aggregator,” perhaps a lawyer in or near
New Orleans, who is developing an “inventory” of similar cases. When
the aggregator brings that “inventory” to a federal court, either as an
original action or by removal, it will be consolidated with similar cases
and inventories by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel and sent to a
transferee judge in a jurisdiction, possibly one (in a galaxy) far, far away.
If our Baton Rouge lawyer and New Orleans aggregator are not part of the
MDL elite of repeat players, and thus unlikely to be on the Plaintiffs’
Steering Committee, our hypothetical claimant has been consigned to a
largely non-transparent distant world in which he and his counsel have
little or no voice.152 It is legitimate to wonder whether, under certain
Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017) (analyzing the unique aspects of MDL proceedings
based on interviews with 20 judges).
152. There is some evidence that in certain cases there is a possibility of
participation by individual class members or MDL claimants or their counsel
previously thought not to be feasible. That apparently was and continues to be
true in the NFL Concussions case, In re Nat’l Football Players’ Concussion Injury
Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016), for
example. See Cabraser & Issacharoff, supra note 64 (discussing the emergence of
active class member participation). See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Mark
Herrmann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped
Potential of the Internet, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROBS.
451 (2012). In the NFL Concussions case, for example, District Judge Anita
Brody held a post-settlement hearing regarding the distribution of benefits that
players could attend by way of the Internet, Post-Settlement Hearing, In re Nat’l
Football Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015),
http://events7.mediasite.com/Mediasite/Play/8ad6d89e23e3487797b85b34a2f68
4c31d [https://perma.cc/XG28-TWHW]. The level of participation Cabraser and
Issacharoff describe in cases like NFL Concussions and Volkswagen Emissions
probably cannot be realized or be meaningful in small claim class actions and
MDL proceedings. But the Internet undoubtedly provides an excellent medium
for seeking the participation of people anywhere in the world in anticipated or
commenced litigation as in those cases. See generally John Coffee, The
Globalization of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Law, Culture and Incentives, 165 U.
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circumstances, the individual should be permitted to exit the consolidated
proceeding as members of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are permitted to
do.153 But would that undermine the aggregative value of the MDL
procedure?154
Some academics and practitioners have raised a concern about certain
powers transferee judges occasionally assume. For example, in some cases
they create what are termed “quasi-class actions,” as in In re Zyprexa
Products Liability Litigation155 and In re World Trade Center Lower
Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation,156 by asserting control over attorneys’
fees and appraising the quality of the private settlements the parties have
PA. L. REV. 1895 (2017). The same medium is being used for transmitting
settlement notices and facilitating aspects of the benefit distribution process. E.g.,
In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015).
153. See generally Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 151, at 681–87
(discussing various advantages of recognizing some right of exit); Roger C.
Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and “Settlement Class Actions”: An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 821–22 (1995) (referring to individuals
in aggregate litigation as “kidnapped” riders).
154. The Supreme Court’s denial of personal jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers,
supra notes 26–29, over nonresidents whose claims are not related to the
defendant’s in-forum activities raises questions about a transferee court’s ability
to adjudicate an MDL’s merits—as opposed to simply managing its pretrial
proceedings—absent the parties’ consent with regard to those plaintiffs and
defendants who do not have a jurisdictionally sufficient relationship with the
transferee forum. It certainly suggests that the consent must be actual and not
virtual. See Armstrong v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 552 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2009).
Some of these issues have been raised in connection with bellwether trials in a
mandamus petition in In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant
Products Liab. Litig., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (J.P.M.L. 2011). Since the decision
in Bristol-Myers is constitutionally based, it is questionable whether even
amending the MDL statute to authorize the transferee court’s adjudication of the
merits, as has been periodically proposed, see supra note 141, could provide
personal jurisdiction over the unaffiliated participants, although the argument for
that result might be stronger with regard to those plaintiffs who file directly in the
transferee forum or if the remark in the Bristol-Myers opinion about the possibility
that a different constitutional personal jurisdiction standard exists for the federal
courts—or at least in federal question cases—shows signs of vitality. See supra
note 28 and accompanying text.
155. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); see also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D.
La. 2008); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *19 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
156. In re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 758 F.3d
202 (2d Cir. 2014).
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reached. The Multidistrict Litigation Act is silent on these matters.
Moreover, these activities have been undertaken without explicit provision
for protections comparable to those available in some or all Rule 23 class
actions—adequacy of representation, notice, predominance, superiority,
opt-out, and judicial approval of class counsel, attorneys’ fees, and
settlement. None of these are provided for by the Act.
Treating an MDL as a quasi-class action results in heightened control
of the litigation by the transferee judge and diminished participation by
those lawyers who are not among the lead counsel. Thus, some have
wondered where the judicial authority to do it comes from.157 Perhaps it is
a byproduct of a federal judge’s inherent or managerial power to appoint
and compensate lead counsel and to protect the absentee claimants.158 Or
perhaps it simply reflects some notion of necessity or a variation on the
ancient equity maxim that regards “as done that which ought to be
done.”159 Critics assert, however, that there is no judicial authority to
second guess, let alone veto, what private parties have chosen to do in
connection with a non-class action settlement.160
Judicial involvement may well be desirable, however. Given the high
settlement rate in class actions and MDL proceedings, there always have
been concerns about whether the plaintiffs’ lead counsel actually
negotiates for the best terms for their clients—particularly the absent
157. See generally Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”:
A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1014–23
(2005) (rethinking the principles that animate class actions and rejecting the
predominance test); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50
DUKE L.J. 381 (2000) (arguing ethical safeguards are not sufficient to ensure
adequate representation); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The QuasiClass Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011) [hereinafter Mullenix, Dubious
Doctrines] (arguing that quasi-class actions do not resolve claims by giving full
consideration to the interests of individual injured parties); Silver & Miller, supra
note 150 (proposing an alternative method of MDL management to allow lawyers
to design governance structures).
158. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Fla. Everglades on December 29,
1972, 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 802 F. Supp.
2d 740 (E.D. La. 2011); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 2010 WL 716190,
at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb 24, 2010).
159. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 33 (Stanford Univ. Press 1967).
160. See generally Erichson, supra note 157 (arguing that the parties have not
consented to judicial intervention); Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 157
(arguing that quasi-class actions do not sufficiently consider the interests of individual
injured parties); Silver & Miller, supra note 150 (proposing an alternative method of
MDL management to allow lawyers to design governance structures).
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claimants.161 To what extent might they, perhaps unintentionally, become
distracted by self-interest? That could take the form of plaintiffs’ lead
counsel foregoing pressing for additional monies or other remedies that
could benefit the plaintiffs in exchange for the defendants’ cooperation
regarding the attorneys’ fee that ultimately will be sought from the court.
Thus, it is important that the presiding judge in class and other aggregated
proceedings carefully scrutinize the behavior and performance of
attorneys when they petition for fees and cost reimbursement, as well as
the terms of every settlement, particularly regarding appraising the true
value of what the claimants will receive. Unfortunately, in some cases
certain settlement elements have been found to be of little or no value.162
B. Judicial Management
MDL practice exemplifies another transformation in our civil justice
system: the birth, maturation, and pervasiveness of judicial management.
This is one of the most significant procedural developments that has
occurred during my professional life. It is one that has dramatically altered
161. See Burch, Monopolies, supra note 139, at 74–75 (“[S]elf-interest can
take over if left unchecked, and no checks exist.”); Erickson, supra note 157;
Christopher B. Mueller, Taking a Second Look at MDL Product Liability
Settlements: Somebody Needs to Do It, 65 KAN. L. REV. 531 (2017) (questioning
the legitimacy and processing of these settlements and suggesting the need for
collateral review); Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines, supra note 157. See generally
Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (2016) (discussing the signs of
a settlement that harms claimants and benefits their counsel and defendants);
Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337; Silver & Miller, supra note 150, at 134 (suggesting that
settlements should simply refer the question of fees to the court); Margaret S.
Williams, Emery G. Lee III & Catherine R. Borden, Repeat Players in Federal
Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141 (2012) (discussing the impact of
generalist versus specialist plaintiff attorneys on the operation of multidistrict
litigation proceedings).
162. See, e.g., In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices
Litig., 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017) (characterizing the settlement as “worthless”);
see discussion infra notes 180–181; Pearson v. NBTY, 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir.
2014) (finding a short-term product labelling change to be of no value to the
class); Dennis v. Kellogg Corp., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (expressing concern
that “self-interest” influenced the negotiation’s outcome). See generally Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015)
(arguing fees should be awarded based on what benefits the lead lawyers actually
achieve for the plaintiffs).
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the respective roles of judges and lawyers in civil litigation. Management
had its genesis in the unique and effective handling of a massive cluster of
related antitrust cases by a group of federal judges specially appointed by
Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s. That resulted in attention being
focused on the “problem” of what was then called “The Big Case” and led
to the 1968 enactment of the Multidistrict Litigation Act, the publication
of the quasi-official Manual for Complex Litigation, the explicit validation
of judicial management in the complete revision of Federal Rule 16 in
1983, and the simultaneous expansion of judicial control over the
discovery process.
Perhaps a mea culpa is in order. I was a co-conspirator in these
developments because I worked with the judicial authors of the Manual,
drafted part of it, and was the Reporter for the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee that proposed the 1983 Federal Rule amendments that
validated and encouraged judicial management. So, it was on my watch
that Rule 16 was transformed from a simplistic and largely useless eve-oftrial pretrial conference into an elaborate management menu envisioning
multiple pretrial conferences and orders—replete with sanctions for
noncompliance with its dictates.163 And it was on my watch that the core
discovery rule, Federal Rule 26, was amended to promote the judicial
monitoring of discovery to avoid it becoming redundant or disproportionate.164
Other than a few experiments after the Second World War, judicial
management prior to these developments was virtually non-existent. It was
not thought to be a proper “judicial” function to be a participant in the
163. See generally 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1521–1531 (3d ed. 2010).
Rule 16 was amended again in 1993 to enhance certain aspects of judicial
management and to refer—and thereby encourage resort to—alternative dispute
resolution. A number of states have parallel provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 575 (West 2017); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.602 (2017); MINN. R. CIV. P. 1601 (2017).
164. See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2010). My
contemporary thoughts about the 1983 amendments are summarized in ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (Education and Training Series
1984). I testified against the 2015 amendment to Rule 26 regarding discovery
proportionality because in my view it transformed the 1983 recognition of judicial
discretion to limit discovery if it proved to be excessive into something that can
be applied as a premature precondition on discovery, which I hope does not come
to pass. Statement of Arthur R. Miller Before the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Phoenix, Ariz. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files
/fr_import/ST2015-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T3P-HZWN]. See supra note 78.
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processing of a case rather than simply acting as an umpire regarding the
litigation decisions made by the attorneys. Many district judges even
believed that involvement in the settlement process was particularly
inappropriate. Indeed, when I appeared at various judicial conferences and
training sessions to discuss management and the import of the 1983
Federal Rule amendments, I encountered a fair amount of hostility to the
concept from many judges. That change in their job description was
extremely controversial.165 Today it is taken for granted that management
is part of what judges do and lawyers treat judicial involvement and
participation as quite normative.
It probably is true that the contemporary commitment to judicial
management, especially when linked to the increased importance of
summary judgment, heightened settlement pressures, and the
omnipresence of highly complex multi-party, multi-claim cases, promotes
efficiency and case disposition—laudable goals in the abstract and
certainly the motivation for much of what has happened in recent decades.
But one might ask: is the quest for “efficiency” through management,
“gatekeeping,” and promoting pretrial disposition being achieved at the
expense of other values long thought central to the goals of our civil justice
system? Should management and gatekeeping trump and replace merit
adjudication? To what extent has management reordered the relationship
between the court and counsel, particularly in class actions and MDL
proceedings, perhaps eroding elements of the “adversary” system? And if
that is true, is that good or bad one might ask. Are many of our federal and
state judges increasingly becoming managers rather than adjudicators?
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed
concern that our courts have taken on the trappings of administrative

165. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378–80
(1982). Professor Resnik expressed concern about the potential for judges to abuse
their discretionary power under a case management regime. Other scholars believe
the rewards of management outweigh its risks. See Steven Flanders, Blind UmpiresA Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984) (critiquing Professor
Resnik’s concerns and arguing that judicial management is beneficial). See
generally 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163; Miller, Pretrial Rush to
Judgment, supra note 82, at 1003–07; Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules,
supra note 34, at 54–57. Congress joined the management bandwagon when it
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012), now
largely sunset, which called upon each district court to develop an expense and delay
plan that included considering using “litigation management.”
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agencies and wonders how the activities of agencies can be distinguished
from those of courts.166
IV. WHY HAS ALL OF THIS HAPPENED?
Many reasons are advanced. The cost, delay, and risks of contemporary
litigation are popular explanations.167 These concerns certainly make the
pressure for enhancing the efficiency and economy of litigation and the
desire to separate and terminate litigation chaff as early as possible
understandable. But those reasonable objectives do not necessarily explain
or justify all that has transpired. Two related explanations that reflect the
political and social realities of the times we live in suggest themselves.
First, I do not think it is unfair to say that a number of the Justices on the
current Supreme Court as well as other judges have a predilection, perhaps
subliminal, that favors business and governmental interests.168 A number
166. Patrick Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District
Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745 (2010); see also the references infra note 169.
167. There is a fair amount of data indicating that the civil system is
performing considerably better than the negative suppose “common wisdom”
suggests. See generally STEVEN P. CROWLEY, CIVIL JUSTICE RECONSIDERED 93–
116 (2017); Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085 (2012) [hereinafter
Reda, Cost-and-Delay Narrative]. The available empirical evidence, for example,
suggests that litigation costs are tied to litigation stakes and may not be exorbitant
when viewed from that perspective. See Miller, Double Play on the Federal Rules,
supra note 34, at 61–71; Reda, Cost-and-Delay Narrative, supra, at 1111–32; see
also THOMAS E. WILLGING, DONNA STIENSTRA, JOHN SHAPARD & DEAN MILFICH,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN
CLOSED CIVIL CASES 52 (1997); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra & John
Shapard, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998). My mentor who served as
the Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the 1960s expressed the
view on the Federal Rules’ 50th Anniversary that they were working well. He noted
that they supported “revolutions in the substantive law” and asserted that “the muchcriticized discovery function and class action remain together the scourge of
corporate and governmental malefactors.” Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1879, 1891 (1989). Of course, that comment was made before most of the
procedural retrenchment I described earlier occurred.
168. See generally STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT, THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (examining
conservative challenges to legal liberalism); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 92 MINN. L. REV.
1431, 1470–73 (2013) (concluding that business is favored by the Roberts Court);
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of judicial opinions in recent years, such as some I have referred to, show
that orientation. Second, I think it is fair to say that some Justices and other
judges are disenchanted with civil litigation for various reasons.169
Sensing that shift in judicial attitude and reacting to the difficulties,
costs, and risks of today’s large-scale civil litigation, especially the
possibility of going to trial before a jury, certain conservative and probusiness political and defense interests have been energetically waging an
anti-litigation war for many years to limit resort to the courts and to affect
what happens in them.170 Segments of both the business and legal worlds
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules
and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV.
1731 (2014) (reaching the same conclusion); Wasserman, supra note 90
(asserting that the Roberts Court has reshaped the rules of civil procedure to
the benefit of business interests). A similar attitude has been manifested in
Congress, accounting for the enactment of such business-oriented procedural
legislation as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
105-67, 109 Stat. 737 the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105353 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§
1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012). It also explains the speed with which the
proposed Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong.
(2017), described supra note 66, went through the House of Representatives
without any meaningful scrutiny.
169. The growth of court caseloads in many parts of the country, the expansion
and complexity of substantive law, and the bureaucratization of the federal
judiciary should not be ignored as factors contributing to today’s preoccupation
with efficiency and gatekeeping. See generally Owen N. Fiss, The
Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1982) (looking at the
transformation of the judiciary into a large-scale organization); Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, Access to Justice within the Federal Courts—A Ninth Circuit
Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033 (2012) (a distinguished federal judge describing
the limited capacity and resources of the federal courts); Judith Resnik, The
Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998) (noting the emergence of an
administrative judiciary).
170. The political aspects of the anti-litigation war, which the authors refer to
as the counterrevolution to the growth of the Litigation State, is chronicled in
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 11, at 16–62.
The current judicial love affair with arbitration is evidence of that
disenchantment. The pro-arbitration movement is recounted in Gilles, The Day
Doctrine Died, supra note 99; see also Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure,
supra note 77, at 322–31 & nn.135–69 (explaining the growth of, and the Supreme
Court’s support for, arbitration). See generally Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 99; Siegel, supra note 90 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was
consistently motivated by its mistrust of civil litigation). The class-action has
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have engaged in a strident and rather successful campaign against the class
action—indeed, against litigation in general—both in the courts and in the
public arena that undoubtedly has affected politicians, public perception,
and perhaps some judges. Indeed, in addition to being instrumental in
causing the procedural retrenchment and erection of stop signs I described
earlier and motivating numerous constrictions of substantive law, the
campaign has influenced who is elected and appointed as judges in various
parts of the country.171 Not surprisingly, it has dampened the willingness
of some members of the plaintiffs’ bar to undertake risky, even potentially
meritorious, cases.172
The defense bar and its clients have devoted extraordinary resources
to these endeavors that cannot be matched by those on the plaintiffs’ side,
which historically has not been able to organize itself effectively—
although it seems to be doing better of late—and is divided philosophically
along entrepreneurial and public interest lines. The anti-litigation forces
have played on the distrust many Americans have of lawyers, particularly
been a primary target of defense interests in the anti-litigation war. See Stephen
B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against
Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2017).
171. See generally Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the
Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Politicize
the Judiciary (Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series,
RWP15-001, 2015), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers
/Index. (noting that although lawyers tend to be liberal, judges tend to be
conservative, arguing that the disparity reflects the politicization of the judiciary)
[https://perma.cc/7U39-MCGS]. See, e.g., SCOTT GREYTAK, ALICIA BANNON,
ALLYSE FALCE, LINDA CASEY & LAURA KINNEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
BANKROLLING THE BENCH: THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2013–14
(2015), http://newpoliticsreport.org/report/2013-14/ [https://perma.cc/SQ43-TD4X].
Conservative Justices on the Supreme Court have been found to have a lower proprivate enforcement voting rate than liberal Justices, supporting the notion that “the
long decline in pro-private enforcement outcomes has been driven by the votes of
conservative justices.” BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra
note 11, at 115.
172. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHAKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN &
ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE CASES POLITICAL: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Brookings Inst. Press 2006) (claiming that the political
convictions of judges affect their decisions in cases when the law does not provide
a clear answer); TELES, supra note 168 (charting the development of the
conservative legal movement from the 1970s); Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive
Bias, the “Band of Experts,” and the Anti-Litigation Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L.
REV. 755, 756–57, 772–83 (2016) (describing and debunking the “decades-long
anti-litigation lobbying effort” that is “designed to convince all of us that litigation
is pathologically abusive”).
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plaintiffs’ lawyers;173 characterized lawsuits as abusive, frivolous, and
extortionate; and painted class actions as “lawyer’s cases” that award class
attorneys millions of dollars in fees but give individual class members only
pennies or a few dollars—conveniently ignoring the cumulative value of
the class’s recovery. In addition, they claim that lawsuits impose a
“litigation tax” on Americans and impair the competitiveness of American
businesses in the global marketplace.174
The anti-litigation war has become a political issue and has had
significant consequences. Populist judiciaries in several states have been
voted out and replaced.175 The campaign has been augmented—
inadvertently, I suspect—by rather one-sided media attention, which often
repeats dubious horror stories, embraces the defense portrayal of litigation,
and often depicts the plaintiffs’ bar in negative terms.176
173. See generally Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 90
(discussing President Reagan’s public hostility towards public interest lawyers who
he characterized as “‘a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own
thing at the expense of the . . . poor who actually need help’ and as ‘working for
left-wing special interest groups at the expense of the public’”); Eric D. Green, What
Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches: Bringing Rule 23
Into the Twenty-first Century, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1997) (“[F]rom the
defendants’ perspective, class actions are the ultimate weapon of legal terrorism,
launched by litigation-mad, bottom-feeding, money-hungry, professional plaintiffs’
lawyers.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform:
Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 450 (2004)
(people have “fulminated against the bar as . . . plagues of ‘locusts’”).
174. See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). Nonetheless, there probably is a consensus for the
proposition that a significant portion of the inefficiencies, delays, and high costs
of contemporary litigation is a result of lawyer behavior that produces
unnecessary or avoidable proceedings resulting from lawyering styles, habits,
hourly billing practices, and professional competition. See generally Marrero,
supra note 88 (arguing that the procedural rules are not at fault; rather it is how
the rules are practiced).
175. Just by way of example, between 2000 and 2009 Alabama had the highest
campaign spending on judicial races of any state. The Alabama Supreme Court
went from being entirely composed of Democrats in 1994 to completely
Republican in 2004. See JOHN F. KOWAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
SELECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2016), https://www.brennancenter.org
/sites/default/files/publications/Judicial_Selection_21st_Century.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4NZF-Z3RN]; see also id. at 12 (“[J]udges increasingly face the threat of
electoral retribution when they rule in ways that offend powerful interests.”).
176. KOWAL, supra note 175, at 10 (“In the 2013-2014 election cycle, outside
spending by interest groups, including political action committees and social
welfare organizations, accounted for nearly 30 percent of total spending, nearly
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The effects of this anti-litigation campaign and demonization of
lawyers works against those in the lower and middle economic classes who
are most in need of meaningful entre to the civil justice system.177 That is
an unfortunate echo of today’s much discussed societal inequities
reflecting the stunning disparity in political and economic power, income,
and status in our nation. It has led some to argue that to a very significant
degree the existing federal rulemaking structure, Supreme Court practice,
and high-stakes litigation are dominated by an elite segment of the legal
profession and the major entities they represent, enabling them to pursue
an agenda that has led to the distortion of the civil justice system’s
procedure and has disadvantaged the people actually involved in the vast
majority of cases in our courts.178 Whatever the merit of these points, the
doubling the record share, pre-Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, [558
U.S. 310 (2010)] of 16 percent in 2003-04 . . . from 1994 to 2014, spending on
judicial races exceeded $420 million. Much of that staggering sum went to fund
television advertising.”). See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN,
DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 39 (2004);
Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The
Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293
(2016); Mark Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Thornburg, supra note 172, at
772–83. A textbook illustration is the media coverage of the so-called
McDonald’s coffee spill case, which consistently understated the gravity of the
plaintiffs’ injuries and her modest claim for relief, overstated the size of her
recovery, and never really reported the nature of the defendant’s fault. See Liebeck
v. McDonald’s Rests., P.T.S., Inc., 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994),
vacated by agreement, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994). Seven years
after the case ended HBO aired a documentary entitled Hot Coffee that finally put
the matter in proper prospective. HOT COFFEE (The Group Entertainment 2011).
177. Some scholars have expressed concern that the various procedural
restraints I have discussed have marginalized some people and social out-groups.
See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 504
(2012) (arguing that procedural limits on court access harm society by keeping
marginalized plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious civil rights claims); Spencer, The
Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, supra note 90, at 361–62, 366–70 (“Civil
procedure tends to . . . protect[] commercial defendants against claims by members
of various out-groups.”).
178. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV.
1005, 1050 (2015) (“As with politics and economics, a one percent regime [of
procedure]—while good for the one percent—leaves the great ninety-nine percent
far behind.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking
and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015)
(discussing the role of rulemaking in litigation reform, focusing on the
backgrounds of the Advisory Committee members and the then-proposed
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fact is that all of the procedural stop signs I described earlier179 inhibit
access, promote pretrial termination, and avoid full merit adjudication
across the litigation spectrum. Analogous charges, of course, can be
levelled at the consequences of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
mandatory one-by-one arbitration clauses.
But let me try not to fall prey to the fallacy of the black and the white.
I have to acknowledge that there have been some marginal—and some
might even be called silly or frivolous—lawsuits that receive considerable
attention and contribute to the negative imagery projected by defense
interests and the media. Everyone has his or her favorite. Mine is a recent
unfair trade practices class action under a state consumer protection statute
providing for an attorney fee award against the fast food company Subway
that advertises “foot-long” sandwiches. Occasionally, the plaintiff
asserted, the sandwiches turn out to be only 11 or 11.5 inches long. The
company insisted its sandwiches have the same food and nutritional
content as those in the advertisements. Even if the case had factual merit
and some potential for promoting compliance with consumer protection
laws, the optics are bad. As it turned out, most of the sandwiches tested
actually were 12 inches long and when they were less than that the
shortage usually was only one-fourth of an inch. The class settled for about
$525,000, which went to the lawyers less the $500 given to each of the ten
named plaintiffs.180 The district court’s approval of the settlement was
reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that it enriched only the
lawyers and class representatives; the benefits to the other class members
were characterized as “worthless.”181

amendments approved for consideration by the Judicial Conference’s Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure); John G. Heyburn II & Francis E.
McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIG. 26 (2012)
(referring to a survey finding that “[a] substantial group of local plaintiffs’ counsel
resent the [Multidistrict Litigation] panel’s role in facilitating national plaintiffs’
counsels’ ‘takeover’ of their cases.”). Judge Heyburn and Professor McGovern
criticize the “repeat-player syndrome in the selection of plaintiffs’ MDL counsel.”
Id. at 30. Multidistrict Litigation is discussed supra notes 137–162.
179. See discussion supra Part II.
180. In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 316
F.R.D. 240 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d, 869 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Eric
Goldman, Why The Subway ‘Footlong’ Lawsuits Fell Short, FORBES (2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2016/02/29/why-the-subway-footlonglawsuits-fell-short/#261aac6869f2 [https://perma.cc/H5V8-PEU6].
181. In re: Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 869
F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2017).
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Less “newsworthy” cases that perform a more significant policyenforcing function rarely are given comparable media attention.182 Having
spent many years dabbling in television, I understand that the “foot-long”
story is one that is easy and “catchy” to tell and pictorialize. Moreover,
realistically a newspaper reporter allotted only a few inches to tell her story
or a television reporter with 30 or 45 seconds of airtime cannot be expected
to include a lecture on the societal values of deterring wrongdoing, the
importance of truth in advertising, or an explanation of the risks of
contingent fee representation.
The “foot-long” lawsuit and others like it raise the basic question I
asked at the outset: what are courts for? What is a “real case”? To me, a
case that helps effectuate a statutory or judicially established policy
prohibiting unfair trade practices or advertising misrepresentations is a
“real” case, regardless of the gravity of the individual’s injury, the
monetary stakes, or whether the lawyer’s motivation is an attorney’s fee
or a societal good.183 But I recognize that people have disparate views on
the utility of using limited public resources—the courts—to litigate about
practices and products that have not caused any palpable injury to some or
most of the victims of deleterious behavior, and some critics deplore the
possibility of overcompensation and over-deterrence.184
The questions and choices are easily stated. Should the system
exercise itself over “trivial” regulatory violations involving such things as
data breaches, advertising, labelling, or packaging, and a host of other
business practices that the law considers actionable under tort, contract, or

182. See BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 11,
at 225 (demonstrating that the media coverage of Supreme Court rulings on the
private enforcement of rights is less than the coverage on decisions concerning
the rights themselves, “helping to forestall public perceptions that justices are
legislators in black robes”).
183. In class I sometimes teasingly analogize giving people a new substantive
right to giving someone a Ferrari. It may be a wondrous gift, but it has no value if
the recipient cannot afford gasoline. Analogously, it is the availability of an
attorney and incentivizing him or her with the prospect of a fee award, as well as
the availability of a functional aggregation procedure, that will fuel the
substantive right and make it meaningful. Without that, the right will remain
largely unused.
184. Occasionally, a note of judicial frustration is sounded. “This is another of
the surprisingly many junk-fax suits under . . . the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.” Chapman v. All Am. Painting, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 784 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Easterbrook, C.J.). See generally Marcus, Bending in the Breeze, supra note 45,
at 520–30.
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warranty theories?185 Or should the system metaphorically close its eyes
in the name of husbanding its limited resources for more “significant”
matters? Do we think the answer is to leave these defalcations to the
regulators, who we know are under-resourced and tend to be captured by
those they supposedly regulate? Or should Americans just grin and bear
deceptive economic practices and emotional slights?
V. SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
When I think of today’s penchant for early termination, the ubiquitous
federal court judicial management dynamic and its osmosis into a number
of state court systems, the movement out of the public court system into
private dispute resolution in the form of mandatory contractual arbitration,
mediation, Feinbergization, and related trends including mandatory
disclosure, bellwether trials, and the pervasive work-out and settlement
mentality in the bench and bar, it seems to me that a significant erosion of
the merit-determination orientation of our civil system and the aspirations
of the procedural Gold Standard have taken place. I never thought I would
hear a federal district judge say to me that “if any case on my docket
reaches trial, I have failed.” But I have. Also, I have no doubt that many
of the changes I have described, particularly the procedural retrenchment
185. Recently, so-called “slack-fill” lawsuits have appeared claiming consumer
injury when food packages are under-filled, giving the appearance that purchasers are
getting more product than they actually are. See, e.g., In re McCormick & Co., Inc.
Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 215 F. Supp. 3d 51 (D.D.C. 2016)
(holding that a competitor’s claim under the Lanham Act and for violations of state
deceptive trade practices for slack-filled black pepper packaging was sufficiently
stated); Paul Zibro, McCormick Seeks to Dismiss “Slack Fill” Lawsuit, WALL ST. J.
(July 17, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles /mccormick-seeks-to-dismiss-slackfill-lawsuit-1437164034 [https://perma.cc/85 8U-R4RV]. Do these actions keep food
companies honest or are they frivolous nuisance suits? These and other cases of this
type, such as the Subway “foot-long” case, typically pose serious questions regarding
the ascertainability of the class members—who purchased the challenged product or
whose files were hacked? See, e.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir.
2012); Oshana v. Coca Cola Co., 472 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 2006). Most of the cases die
an early death. See, e.g., Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming
the grant of a motion to dismiss because plaintiff could not plausibly allege that the
product’s design and packaging were deceptive when the correct weight was stated).
See generally Joyce Hanson, Slack-Fill Suits Boom Despite Few Class Wins, LAW360
(Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/912004/ [https://perma.cc /69AKFMT7]. The proposed Fairness in Class Actions Act discussed in note 66, supra,
would burden the processing of these “personal injury” claims in significant ways,
including by insisting on ascertainability of class members at certification.
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and “national policy” favoring arbitration, have contributed to what we
now characterize as the “vanishing” trial and the demise of our
commitment to the civil jury that many bemoan.186 In parts of the country,
our federal judges, to put it simply, have less and less “bench presence.”187
The phenomena I have been discussing seem to be progressing as my
television mentor, the late Fred Friendly, used to say—in a stealth-like
“one-degree-it-is” fashion. Does anyone other than those benefitting or
being burdened by the systemic changes notice or care about them? Is the
ongoing procedural retrenchment and the flight from the courts positive or
negative? Is arbitration speedier, more economic and “juster” than
adjudication in the courts? Is management for trial more or less efficient
than erecting stop signs and managing for settlement? Although system
participants and observers have visceral feelings and a range of viewpoints,
I submit we do not really know—and may never know—the answers to
these questions. I have a feeling we are proceeding largely in the dark.
Shouldn’t we worry about that? Shouldn’t we insist on some enlightenment,
perhaps in the nature of a cost-benefit analysis comparing the “value” of
procedural stop signs, MDLs, and judicial management versus more robust
and efficient merit adjudication as well as an analysis of the competing
“values” of the public and private systems? But who would we trust to do
that analysis and would we believe whatever conclusions were offered?
The means for diverting cases away from an adjudication of their merits
have greatly expanded in past decades. Many of the justifications for the
procedural changes I have described are based on assumptions about the
litigation world. They are not based on reliable evidence, and many of
them are well-worn clichés peddled by interest groups who would prefer
186. Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts has been a leading
crusader on this subject. See, e.g., United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1,
21–27 (D. Mass. 2011) (arguing in an addendum to his opinion against an
“administrative model” of the courts); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials,
Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (“[T]he
civil jury trial has all but disappeared.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Joseph F.
Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s Lament over
the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010) (discussing
“the vanishing jury trial”); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL &
LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil
Trials in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (arguing that our
system should be termed “nontrial procedure”).
187. See Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An
Updated Look at Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565
(2014) (discussing judges’ declining courtroom hours and the resulting consequences,
such as reduced accuracy, fairness, and effectiveness of court services).
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to close courthouse doors, countered by those trying to keep them open.
One thing is clear: The pretrial process is now littered with procedural
detours and stop signs that did not exist when Alvin and I were youngsters.
Do we really know what they are accomplishing?
Perhaps it is naïve or too academic of me to suggest that maybe we
should just start over, wipe the slate clean, and invent a new civil
procedure system as we did in 1938.188 Easier said than done, of course. A
drastic reevaluation might mean that the existing Federal Rules, the Rules
Enabling Act,189 the Arbitration Act, and the Multidistrict Litigation Act
would have to be rethought and might go under the legislative knife, or at
least be reorganized. Similarly, our questionable commitment to procedural
trans-substantivity might have to be interred; one set of universal court
procedures regardless of substantive context, a worthy objective of the
comparatively simple litigation world of the 1930s, probably does not make
sense in the 2020s:190 “One size does not fit all.”191 Segregating cases and
188. There are scholars who believe that the third iteration of American
procedure—common law, code, and Federal Rule—has ended and opine that we
already are in a fourth era that focuses on judicial management, mediation, arbitration,
and efficiency, and less on merit adjudication. See Subrin & Main, supra note 90.
Despite my lifetime commitment to the Gold Standard, I fear they are right.
189. Arguably decisions such as Twombly, Iqbal, and the summary judgment
trilogy, as well as the politicization (and partial paralysis) of the rulemaking process
indicate the Enabling Act might usefully be rethought. See Miller, Deformation of
Federal Procedure, supra note 77. For example, the composition of the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee has been criticized for its “homogeneity” and ideological biases.
See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 172, at 784–92.
190. See Miller, Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 370 (“For
example, consideration should be given to abandoning the transsubstantive principle
requiring that the Federal Rules be ‘general’ and applicable to all cases—a notion that
supposedly is embedded in the Rules Enabling Act.”). See generally Robert G. Bone,
Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324,
333–34 (2008) (stating that trans-substantivity is not an “independent value” of the
Federal Rules); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940 (1989)
(“[U]niformity and trans-substantivity . . . are a sham.”); David Marcus, The Past,
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 371, 373 (2010) (discussing the history and precarious existence of transsubstantivity). But cf. ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE 75 (Foundation Press 1979) (arguing trans-substantivity promotes
neutrality). Several of the existing Rules call for a different treatment of certain actions.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b), 23.1, 23.2, 26(a).
191. See Richard McMillan, Jr. & David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track
Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
431 (1985) (proposing a fast-track process for certain disputes); Miller,
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assigning them to different procedural tracks by dimension or complexity,
as has been employed in other countries,192 and what we already do with
limited jurisdiction and specialized courts at both the state and federal
level, may be worth considering. Perhaps fast-tracking some categories of
run-of-the-mine cases would lead to their expeditious merit adjudication.
Why should they be plagued by “plausibility” pleading, proportionate
discovery inquiries, and time and resource consuming summary judgment
motion practice?193
Realistically, I doubt that much of this is feasible in the near term. The
undertaking would be too risky and grandiose. Moreover, a meaningful
overhaul would call for the kind of consensus and political activity
unlikely to materialize let alone bear fruit given the current makeup of
Congress and the federal courts, as well as the lobbying power of the
defense community. Questions about procedure are out of the shadows.
Deformation of Federal Procedure, supra note 77, at 370–71 (arguing that serious
consideration should be given to the idea of “putting cases on different litigation
tracks and devising different procedures that are deemed appropriate for the
characteristics of the cases posted to each track”); Miller, Double Play on the
Rules, supra note 34, at 118–25 (making similar suggestions); Stephen N. Subrin,
The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One
Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 398–405 (2010) (proposing
a simple procedure for cases involving low-value disputes).
192. See ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES
OF PRACTICE §§ 12.1–12.72 (3d ed. 2013) (describing tracking in the English system);
ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] §§ 592, 689 (Ger.),
reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (C.H. Beck ed., 57th ed. 1999) (delineating the
German system of summary proceedings for actions seeking payment of a sum of
money or the delivery of goods); see also PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER,
GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 425–28 (2004) (describing the German Code provision).
Many civilian systems have specialized commercial courts or panels. See, e.g., CODE
DE COMMERCE [C. COM.] [CODE OF COMMERCE] arts. L.721-1 to 724-7 (Fr.);
GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] [Constitution of the Courts Act] § 105 (Ger.),
reprinted in ZIVILPROZESSORDUNG (Richard Zöller ed., 23rd rev. ed. 2002).
193. The resource commitment by counsel and the court now common on
summary judgment motions, for example, makes one wonder whether the frequency
of today’s invocation of the procedure actually does not promote efficiency. See
Marrero, supra note 88, at 1667–70. Judge Marrero suggests that the results of these
motions may be “counterproductive” and are “decidedly unimpressive.” Id. There
have been numerous expressions of concern at the state level about the federal
procedural transformation discussed supra Part I, particularly with regard to the
restrictions that impact the ability to secure the private enforcement of state law in the
federal courts. See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure,
70 STAN. L. REV. __(2018) (forthcoming 2018), https://Chicagounbound.uchicago
.edu/journal_articles/8818/ [https://perma.cc/KW3G-WCEX].
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Whenever procedural changes are proposed these days, especially when
the economic or regulatory consequences might be significant, the long
knives come out and self-interest comes to the fore on both sides of the
“v.”194
I think the judge we remember and honor today had it right. He
cautioned in a law review article: “No judge worthy of his office wants
merely to dispose of cases as if he were working on an assembly line. We
all seek the just result. We are all mindful of the adage that no case is decided
until it is decided right.”195 A few years later, in a well-known dissent, he
wrote: “Judicial case management, avoidance of delay, and denial of
unjustified continuances are all commendable. They are, however, only
means to an end. That end is justice; justice done and perceived to be
done.”196
How true and how relevant to what is happening in our courts today.
That passage obliges us to think. Are we still serious about achieving “the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding” as Federal Rule 1 implores? There always has been a sense
that the application of the Federal Rules should accommodate all three of
those objectives.197 To me, “speedy” and “inexpensive” in Rule 1 should
not be pursued at the expense of what is “just.” Although a short word,
“just” embraces objectives of enormous significance that should not be
subordinated to the other two. Should we—can we—preserve a Gold
Standard procedural system? Can we afford not to? Even assuming it is
efficient, does the current treatment of pleadings, discovery, motions to
dismiss, class actions, expert witnesses, summary judgment, and the flight
from the courthouse to arbitration and other private arrangements
undermine the societal values of the public courts?

194. I am still capable of modest optimism on occasion. See generally Miller,
Preservation and Rejuvenation, supra note 62, at 296–300.
195. Alvin B. Rubin, Views From the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448,
453 (1976).
196. McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1353 (5th Cir.
1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting). A decade earlier, as a district judge, he wrote: “This
feeling that justice is a supreme goal, this sense that it is a predicate to organized
society, is no mere yearning, for it is only a fair proceeding . . . that we can with
any legitimacy call another human being to account.” United States v. McDaniels,
379 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (E.D. La. 1974).
197. Admittedly, these objectives always have been somewhat in tension with
each other; the words are inherently ambiguous, and their meaning is quite
subjective.
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EPILOGUE
I leave these matters to those of you who are inheriting the system.
After all, you are now the trustees of civil justice and cannot simply blame
your predecessors for its warts and bumps and do nothing about them. You
must now try to give the words in Rule 1 meaning for the future. As for
me, having said my piece and having tried to channel Judge Rubin,
perhaps it is time to lie down in a pasture, munch grass, and stop bothering
people by asking them questions like: What are courts for?

